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HUMAN CLONING AND THE CONSTITUTION
CLARKE D. FoRSYTHE'
The thing that has saved man from his limited visions in the past has
been the difficulty of devising suitable means for reaching them.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent publicity given to the cloning of a sheep in Scotland and the
January 1998 declaration by a Chicago physicist, Richard Seed, that he will
attempt to clone a human being in the next few years have sparked public
anxiety about real or imagined dangers of human cloning and spurred efforts in
Congress and many states to prohibit human cloning. The scientific and public
interest is not new; this is at least the third episode of intense publicity given to
cloning over the past thirty years.2 This time, however, the technology
apparently exists to make human cloning a reality in the near future.
The report out of Scotland sparked international opposition to human
cloning. In January 1998, nineteen European nations signed a ban on human
cloning. The World Health Organization (WHO) issued an official statement
against human cloning in March 1997. Immediately after the Scottish report,
President Clinton issued an executive order banning the use of federal funds for
human cloning.' Subsequently, in the wake of Richard Seed's announcement
* B.A., Allegheny College, 1980; J.D., Valparaiso University, 1983. I am grateful to Michael
DeBoer, Robert Destro, Richard Doerflinger, Dale Erickson, Sue Alice Erickson, Dianne Irving,
Phil King, Albert Moraczewki, Nik Nikas, Victor Rosenblum, Jay Sappington, and Nicole Spaur
for research assistance, editorial assistance, or comments on earlier drafts and to the staff of the
Homewood, Illinois Public Library for extensive research assistance. This article is dedicated to the
memory of David W. Louisell, Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley, Boalt
Hall.
1. Robert S. Morison, Comments on Genetic Evolution, in EVOLUTION AND MAN'S PROGRESS
41 (Hudson Hoagland & Ralph W. Burhoe eds., 1962).
2. See generally GINA KOLATA, CLONE: THE ROAD TO DOLLY AND THE PATH AHEAD (1998);
LEE M. SILVER, REMAKING EDEN: CLONING AND BEYOND IN A BRAVE NEW WORLD (1997).
3. One report explained:
[R]estrictions have been in place since January 1996 which prohibit the Department of
Health and Human Services (DHHS) from using Federal funds to support cloning
research involving human embryos. President Clinton's March 4 directive to all
Executive departments and agencies extends this ban to all federally supported research,
but does not apply to research done in the private sector.
Cloning Technology: Scientific Developments and Current Guidelines, 77 CONG. DIG. 38, 38 (Feb.
1998).
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in January 1998, the President urged Congress to pass a temporary ban on the
implantation of cloned human embryos.
4
At the President's request, the National Bioethics Advisory Commission
(NBAC) conducted a study of human cloning and issued its report and
recommendations in June 1997. 5 Focusing on implanting cloned embryos and
not on the question of experimenting on cloned human embryos, the
Commission concluded, "given the current stage of science in this area, that any
attempt to clone human beings via somatic cell nuclear transfer techniques is
uncertain in its prospects, is unacceptably dangerous to the fetus and, therefore,
morally unacceptable."6 The Commission made several recommendations: it
suggested that the moratorium on the use of federal funds for purposes of
cloning a child should continue, it urged private researchers "to comply
voluntarily" with the intent of the moratorium, and it encouraged Congress to
pass a federal law to "prohibit anyone from attempting . to create a child
through somatic cell nuclear transfer cloning" with a three-to-five year "sunset
provision."' Emphasizing that "different ethical and religious perspectives and
traditions are divided on many of the important moral issues that surround any
attempt to create a child using somatic cell nuclear transfer techniques," the
Commission urged the federal government to "encourage widespread and
continuing deliberation on these issues" and to foster "appropriate long-term
policies regarding this technology. "'
The Scottish report and the Seed announcement also spurred legislation in
the U.S. Congress to prohibit human cloning, the implantation of cloned human
embryos, or the use of federal funds for such purposes. The Kennedy-Feinstein
bill (S. 1602) would not prevent cloning embryos but would prohibit
implantation.9 It would make it "unlawful" to "perform or use somatic cell
nuclear transfer with the intent of introducing the product of that transfer into
a woman's womb or in any other way creating a human being. "10 It would
4. President Clinton repeated his call for a temporary congressional ban in his January 1998
State of the Union address. Transcript, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1998, at A21. French President
Jacques Chirac has also called for a ban on human cloning. Nicholas Wade, With No Other Dollys
Yet, Cloning Report Draws Critics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1998, at AS.
5. NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION, CLONING HUMAN BEINGS: REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION (1997) [hereinafter
NBAC REPORT].
6. Letter from Harold T. Shapiro, Chair, National Bioethics Advisory Commission, to William
J. Clinton, President of the United States (June 6, 1997), reprinted in NBAC REPORT, supra note
5.
7. Id. at iii-iv.
8. Id. at iv.
9. S. 1602, 105th Cong. (1998).
10. S. 1602.
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also preempt state laws that might regulate or prohibit human cloning. The
Bond-Frist-Gregg bill (S. 1601) would prohibit cloning itself (defined as somatic
cell nuclear transfer)." A bill to ban human cloning in the U.S. Senate failed
on a procedural vote on February 11, 1998.12
Before Congress acts, however, legislation to ban human cloning may first
pass in the states. As of February 10, 1998, thirty-two bills to regulate human
cloning had been introduced in seventeen states. 3 Some bills would only
prohibit implantation of cloned human embryos, allowing experimentation on
cloned human embryos. Others would prohibit the cloning of a human embryo
itself.
Scientists, biotechnology companies, and others invested or involved in
infertility medicine and embryo experimentation have fought congressional
legislation or promised to challenge the constitutionality of such legislation in the
11. S. 1601, 105th Cong. (1998).
12. Helen Dewar & Rich Weiss, Senate Blocks GOP Drive to Quickly Ban Human Cloning,
WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 1998, at A12. Various bills have been introduced in Congress. Neither of
the earliest bills before Congress would touch cloning by blastomere separation, targeting instead
"somatic cell nuclear transfer." One House bill by Congressman Ehlers, a former research
physicist, would prohibit the "use [of] a human somatic cell for the process of producing a human
clone." Human Cloning Prohibition Act, H.R. 923, 105th Cong. § 2(a) (1997). Another Ehlers
bill would prohibit federal funds to conduct or support research on the cloning of humans. H.R.
922, 105th Cong. (1997). A separate bill by Senators Bond and Ashcroft would codify the
President's ban on federal funding for cloning research. S. 368, 105th Cong. (1997). The Bond
bill defines cloning as "the replication of a human individual by the taking of a cell with genetic
material and the cultivation of the cell through the egg, embryo, fetal, and newborn stages into a
new human individual." Id. at § 1(b). A similar bill, prohibiting federal funding for "the creation
of a human embryo or embryos for research purposes," was introduced in the House. H.R. 2264,
105th Cong. (1997). A similar bill was also introduced by Senator Spector. S. 1061, 105th Cong.
(1997).
13. S. 68, Reg. Sess. (Ala. 1998); S. 8, Reg. Sess. (Ala. 1998); S.J. Res. 6, Reg. Sess. (Ala.
1998); S. 241, 139th Gen. Assem., 2d Sess. (Del. 1997); H.R. 1508, 144th Gen. Assem., Reg.
Sess. (Ga. 1997); S. 1243, 90th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 1997); S. 1230, 90th Gen. Assem.,
Reg. Sess. (I11. 1997); S. 411, 110th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 1998); H.R. 5475, 89th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 1998); H.R. Res. 197, 89th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 1998); S. 864, 89th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 1998); H.R. 2730, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 1997); S. 2423, 80th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 1997); H.R. 996, Reg. Sess. (Miss. 1998); H.R. 1658, 155th Sess. of Gen.
Ct., 2d year (N.H. 1998); A. 329, 208th Leg. (N.J. 1998); S. 6071, 221st Ann. Leg. Sess. (N.Y.
1998); A. 9183, 221st Ann. Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 1998); A. 9116, 221st Ann. Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 1998);
S. 5993, 221st Ann. Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 1998); A. 5383, 220th Ann. Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 1997); S.
2877, 220th Ann. Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 1997); S. 218, 122d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1998);
H.R. 675, 122d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1998); H.R. 2128, 182d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess.
(Pa. 1998); H.R. 7123, 1997-98 Leg. Sess. (R.I. 1998); H.R. 3917, Gen. Assem., 112th Sess.
(S.C. 1997); S. 2295, 100th Gen. Assem. (Tenn. 1998); H.R. 2281, 100th Gen. Assem. (Tenn.
1998); H.R. 2198, 100th Gen. Assem. (Tenn. 1998); H.R. 752, 1998 Leg. Sess. (Va. 1998).
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courts.' 4 Although the constitutionality of such legislation has yet to be
addressed by any state or federal court, it likely will be the subject of litigation
in the next few years.
Several questions, as yet unresolved, are the subject of nationwide interest.
What is human cloning? 5 What is the difference between implanting a cloned
human embryo and cloning the embryo for use in experimentation and research?
What is the legal and moral status of the extracorporeal human embryo (that is,
one outside the body)? Is human cloning a constitutional liberty? Is it
encompassed within the abortion liberty created by Roe v. Wade? 6 What
scientific or medical research and development might be furthered by human
cloning? Is cloning a necessary extension of in vitro fertilization (IVF)
technology? What human interests might be served by its regulation or
prohibition? These questions are relevant to the ongoing public and legislative
debates throughout the country as well as to future litigation. 7
14. See, e.g., Should Congress Prohibit All Human Cloning Experimentation?, 77 CONG. DIG.
44, 47, 49, 51 (1998) (including the statements of Alison Taughton-Rigby, Biotechnology Industry
Organization (BIO), and of Lester M. Crawford, National Association of Biomedical Research
(NABR)).
15. The term "clone" is a botanical term for cutting which comes from the Greek root klon
(twig) and refers to grafting procedures that botanists use to propagate plants. Francis C. Pizzulli,
Asexual Reproduction and Genetic Engineering: A Constitutional Assessment of the Technology of
Cloning, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 476, 482 (1974) [hereinafter Pizzulli, Asexual Reproduction] (updated
and reprinted Francis C. Pizzulli, A Constitutional Analysis of Human Cloning and Genetic
Engineering, in BIOLOGICAL AND BEHAVIORAL TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW (Michael H. Shapiro
ed., 1982) [hereinafter Pizzulli, Constitutional Analysis]).
16. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
17. A few books and articles have touched on the legal and constitutional issues involved with
cloning or related technologies. See, e.g., NBAC REPORT, supra note 5, at 95 ("Whether cloning
is best characterized as procreation or as something entirely new and different is a matter of debate,
for which existing decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court offer only partial guidance."); IRA H.
CARMEN, CLONING AND THE CONSTITUTION: AN INQUIRY INTO GOVERNMENTAL POLICYMAKING
AND GENETIC EXPERIMENTATION (1985) (examining recombinant DNA research as "cloning");
Debra Feuerberg Duffy, To Be or Not to Be: The Legal Ramifications of the Cloning of Human
Embryos, 21 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 189 (1995); Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, The
"Orwellian Nightmare" Reconsidered: A Proposed Regulatory Framework for the Advanced
Reproductive Technologies, 25 GA. L. REv. 625 (1991); Charles P. Kindregan, State Power over
Human Fertility and IndividualLiberty, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 1401 (1972); David W. Louisell, Biology,
Law and Reason: Man as Self-Creator, 16 AM. J. JuRis 1 (1971); Pizzulli, Constitutional Analysis,
supra note 15; John A. Robertson, The Question of Human Cloning, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Mar.-
Apr. 1994, at 6 [hereinafter Robertson, Question]; Bonnie Steinbock, The NBAC Report on Cloning
Human Beings: What It Did-and Did Not-Do, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 39, 45-46 (1997) (concluding
that "[i]t is virtually inconceivable that the present Court-or any Court in the near future-would
deem [somatic cell nuclear transfer] cloning to be a fundamental constitutional right. Not only is
it not mentioned anywhere in the Constitution, but it is certainly not assumed by the 'majority of
Americans' to be a basic. right, nor is it part of our country's history and tradition, nor is access to
cloning, or any other reproductive technology, essential to ordered liberty."); Mona S. Amer,
Comment, Breaking the Mold: Human Embryo Cloning and Its Implications for a Right to
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Parts II and III of this Article begin by summarizing the science of human
development and human cloning. Part IV surveys Anglo-American law
protecting developing human beings and how that law affects the status of
extracorporeal human embryos. 8 The implications of this review may be new
to contemporary lawyers and scholars who have been taught to see questions
about developing human life exclusively through the lens of Roe v. Wade. 9
A neutral application of homicide law stretching back several centuries will show
a consistent tradition of protecting the developing human being at every stage of
gestation, such that the killing of a human embryo outside the womb, if
detectable by medical evidence, has always been a homicide.2' Although
homicide law has yet to be applied in such a way to the conception and death
of extracorporeal embryos, this legal tradition nevertheless exists and continues.
Part V reviews substantive due process, Roe v. Wade, and the scope of any
"non-coital procreative liberty."21 Part VI identifies other compelling state
interests that exist to support legal prohibitions or regulations on human
cloning.' Although many reasons to prohibit human cloning-whether the
embryo is implanted or not-have been voiced before the NBAC, Congress, and
state legislatures, the legal capacity of Congress or the states to regulate or
prohibit human cloning comes down to two basic questions. First, is it possible
to prove that extracorporeal human embryos are alive and then killed? Second,
does Roe v. Wade or other constitutional law trump this neutral application of
the law of homicide? While much ethical and legal analysis has addressed the
implications of the implantation of a cloned human embryo and the development
to birth of a fetus, it is likely that the cloning and pre-implantation destruction
of human embryos will be the real issue in public policy.
II. THE SCIENCE OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
Before addressing the ethical and legal issues, a brief summary of human
development and genetics is necessary to understand human cloning, to
distinguish different types of cloning, and to distinguish cloning from other
techniques of genetic engineering and manipulation.23 In order to assess human
Individuality, 43 UCLA L. REv. 1659 (1996).
18. See infra text accompanying notes 66-198.
19. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 136-49.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 199-281.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 282-333.
23. "Genetic engineering" and "genetic manipulation" have become commonly used terms.
See, e.g., AMERICAN MEDICAL ASsOCIATION, GENEs AND INHERITANCE 16 (Charles B. Clayman
ed., 1993); KOLATA, supra note 2, at 82 ("could keep tiny, finicky human eggs alive in the
laboratory and manipulate them"); GERARD J. TORToRA ET AL., MICROBIOLOGY: AN
INTRODUCTION 228 (4th ed. 1992); Leon R. Kass, Genetic Engineering: Reprise, 220 JAMA 1356
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cloning ethically and legally, it is necessary to start by determining the
ontological and legal status of the developing human embryo As Richard
McCormick has written, "what we may do to" human embryos "depends on
what we think of them."'2 The embryo and the fetus are the two primary
names given to the unborn human during gestation. (Embryo refers to the
unborn human from fertilization to 8-10 weeks gestation, and fetus refers to it
from 8-10 weeks to birth). At various stages in its development, the embryo is
called different things. For example, the embryo is called a blastocyst before
implantation into the endometrium of the uterus, which occurs on day five after
conception. 2
Human cloning involves the genetic replication of a human being. (One
popular magazine has already coined the term "replicant" to refer to the
resulting individual. 26) The science of genetics, the study of heredity, is a
species of molecular biology, and genetics is concerned with the genetic material
found in the cells that compose the human body. (Little was known about the
cell before the study of molecular biology was given great advance by the
development of the microscope in the middle of the seventeenth century.27) A
cell contains a nucleus which contains chromosomes that carry or bear genes.
Genes contain DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) which is "the substance of the
gene."28 Almost all of the DNA in a cell is contained in the nucleus, and
virtually every cell in the human body contains a human being's complete
genetic code.
Most of the scientific understanding of DNA is about fifty years old. In
1944, Avery, MacLeod, and McCarty determined that "DNA is the agent of
genetic transformation. "29 The most famous discovery came in 1953 when
James Watson and Francis Crick identified the chemical structure of DNA-the
double helix-for which they won a Nobel Prize.' With Crick and Watson's
(1972); Leon R. Kass, The Wisdom of Repugnance, NEW REPUBLIC, June 2, 1997, at 17 [hereinafter
Kass, Wisdom of Repugnance]. See also Leon R. Kass, The Wisdom of Repugnance: Why We
Should Ban the Cloning of Humans, 32 VAL. U. L. REv. 679 (1998).
24. Richard A. McCormick, Blastomere Separation: Some Concerns, HASTINGS CTR. REP.,
Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 14-15.
25. Id. at 20-21 (Figures 1-11 and 1-12).
26. Richard Kadry, Carbon Copy.: Meetthe First Human Clone, WIRED, Mar. 1998, at 146-50,
180, 182.
27. See generally 19 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 49 (1992).
28. See generally TORTORA Er AL., supra note 23, at 190-226; Cedric I. Davem, Introduction
to READINGS FROM SCIENt7FtCAMERICAN: GENETICS 2 (1982) [hereinafter SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN].
29. SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, supra note 28, at 3. See MACLYN MCCARTY, THE TRANSFORMING
PRINCIPLE: DISCOVERING THAT GENES ARE MADE OF DNA 170-71 (1985).
30. See Francis H.C. Crick & James D. Watson, A Structure forDeoxyribose Nucleic Acid, 171
NATURE 737-38 (1953); Francis H.C. Crick, Structure of the Hereditary Material, SCI. AM., Oct.
1954, at 54-61.
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discovery, "[tihe understanding of the molecular biology of DNA-its structure,
replication, mutation, recombination, and expression-provided at one and the
same time a material basis for what had once seemed irreconcilable-constancy
and change: constancy deriving from the high fidelity of its replication and
change arising from mutation and its recombination.""'
As with the development of medical science generally, the constantly
developing understanding of genetics and human embryology confirms that the
life of an individual, unique, human being begins with fertilization. In fact,
"[hiuman pregnancy begins with the fusion of an egg and a sperm . . . .*"
Fertilization results in an embryo.33 As one expert in the study of the human
embryo has stated, "the nuclei of the male and female gametes unite, resulting
in the formation of a zygote. containing a single diploid [having the full
complement of chromosomes] nucleus. Embryonic development is considered
to begin at this point."'
Although fertilization can be described as a process or "a series of
processes,"" s at one point within that process-called syngamy-an individual
member of the species homo sapiens sapiens-or human being-begins and
before which that unique being does not exist. That is the point at which the
pronuclei of the sperm and ovum merge and the twenty-three chromosomes of
the male and the twenty-three chromosomes of the female combine to form a
new, unique, individual human entity.' Fertilization of a human ovum by
human sperm results in the full complement of forty-six chromosomes that mark
31. SCIENTtFiC AMERICAN, supra note 28, at 4.
32. BRUCE M. CARLSON, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY AND DEVELOPMENTAL BIOLOGY 3 (1994).
33. The "fertilized egg" is "properly called an embryo." CARLSON, supra note 32, at 3. See
also id. at 24 (Figure 2-2, showing the "transport[ation] of the early embryo down the uterine tube
and into the uterus" (pre-implantation)). "Embryonic life commences with fertilization." RONAN
O'RAHILLY & FABIOLA MULLER, DEVELOPMENTAL STAGES IN HUMAN EMBRYOS 9 (1987).
34. WiLLIAM J. LARSEN, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY 1 (1993). Larsen has noted, "The newly
formed embryo undergoes a series of cell divisions called cleavage as it travels down the oviduct
toward the uterus. The cleavage divisions subdivide the zygote first into two cells, then into four,
then into eight, and so on." Id. at 1-2. He also stated, "This moment of zygote formation may be
taken as the beginning or zero time point of embryonic development." Id. at 19.
35. CARLSON, supra note 32, at 27. See also O'RAHILLY & MULLER, supra note 33, at 9
("Fertilization is the procession of events that begins when a spermatozoon makes contact with an
oocyte or its investments and ends with the intermingling of maternal and paternal chromosomes at
metaphase of the first mitotic division of the zygote.").
36. CARLSON, supra note 32, at 31 ("through the mingling of maternal and paternal
chromosomes, the zygote is a genetically unique product of chromosomal reassortment").
475
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the human species. There is then one single entity (variously called fertilized
ovum, zygote, or embryo). 37
Before fertilization, there may be "life" but there is no unique, individual,
complete human entity. O'Rahilly and Muller explain that "[a]lthough life is a
continuous process, fertilization is a critical landmark because, under ordinary
circumstances, a new, genetically distinct human organism is thereby formed.
This remains true even though the embryonic genome is not actually activated
until 4-8 cells are present, at about 2-3 days. "38 "[Tihe embryonic genome is
formed" with the union (or "envelope vesiculation") of the male and female
pronuclei, and, at that point, "the embryo now exists as a genetic unity." 9
The genetic imput is complete with the formation of that one-celled human
zygote. As two of the foremost pioneers in human embryology noted, "[it is
to be remembered that at all stages the embryo is a living organism, that is, it
is a going concern with adequate mechanisms for its maintenance as of that
time. "40
All cells in the human body start from one cell (the zygote which results
from fertilization). The one-celled zygote begins to cleave, or divide, and
multiply. The cells resulting from these early cleavages are called blastomeres.
"Because they divide mitotically, all blastomeres contain identical chromosomes
and genetic information as the original one-celled zygote."4" Consequently, the
blastomeres are considered totipotent or "capable, on isolation, of forming a
37. See id. at 31 ("When the male and female pronuclei come into contact, their membranes
break down and the chromosomes intermingle. The maternal and paternal chromosomes quickly
become organized around the mitotic spindle in preparation for an ordinary mitotic division. At this
point, the process of fertilization can be said to be complete and the fertilized egg is called a
zygote."); id. at 33 ("Immediately after fertilization, the zygote undergoes a pronounced shift in
metabolism and begins several days of cleavage. During this time the embryo, still encased in its
zona pellucida, is transported down the uterine tube and into the uterus. Roughly 6 days later, the
embryo sheds its zona pellucida and attaches to the uterine lining."). RONAN O'RAHILLY &
FABIOLA MULLER, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY & TERATOLOGY 28 (1994) ("The zygote is characteristic
of the last phase of fertilization and is identified by the first cleavage spindle. It is a unicellular
embryo and is a highly specialized cell."); CARLSON, supra note 32, at 33 ("After the 2-cell stage,
mammalian cleavage is asynchronous, with one of the two cells (blastomeres) dividing to form a 3-
cell embryo. When the embryo consists of approximately sixteen cells, it is sometimes called a
morula (derived from Greek and Latin words means 'mulberry'."). See also id. at 34 (Figure 3-1);
2 LUCINDA L. VEECK, ATLAS OF THE HUMAN OOCYTE AND EARLY CONCEPTUS (Williams &
Wilkins eds., 1991).
38. RONAN O'RA4ILLY & FABIOLA MULLER, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY & TERATOLOGY 8 (2d ed.
1996).
39. Id. at 29.
40. C.H. HEUSER & G.L. STREETER, DEVELOPMENT OF THE MACAQUE EMBRYO (1941),
quoted in O'RAHILLY & MULLER, supra note 37, at v; also quoted in O'RAHILLY & MULLER, Supra
note 33, at 17.
41. 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 281 (Int'l ed. 1991).
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complete embryo."42 Totipotency means "having unlimited developmental
capacity"43 (although it is not accurate to say that this capacity is absolutely
unlimited). Eventually, this one cell, the zygote, divides into many cells, and
these cells differentiate or become specialized, becoming, for example, bone,
hair, or skin cells. Specialized cells also include the female ovum and male
sperm, also called germ cells or gametes. All other cells in the human body (all
non-germ cells) are called somatic cells. If, before the cells become
differentiated, they are artificially separated in vitro (in glass, outside the
womb), they may separately form new individual organisms, a form of artificial
twinning. This explains why the early embryo is the focus of scientific
experimentation; the developmental capacity of the early cells may be used to
develop new medical treatments and therapies.
The human zygote or embryo has undoubted genetic individuality. The
developing human being's sex and its separate and individual genetic identity are
determined at fertilization." As Pauerstein states in his well-recognized
obstetrics text, "[ejach member of a species begins with fertilization-the
successful merging of two different pools of genetic information to form a new
individual."' "When the pronuclei of the ovum and sperm are fused-called
syngamy-[i]nstantaneously, numerous hereditary characteristics of the new
individual are determined."' Within the one-celled human embryo is
contained the entire genetic code of the individual.
Further evidence that the human embryo is undoubtedly a unique, living
human organism from fertilization is provided by the scientific fact that its cells
are metabolizing (processing matter and energy within the cells),47 reproducing,
and growing. But the one-celled human embryo is not simply "human life" but
a human being. It has been noted:
42. O'RAHILLY & MULLER, supra note 37, at 23.
43. NBAC REPORT, supra note 5.
44. See generally CARLSON, supra note 32; LARSEN, supra note 34; O'RAHILLY & MULLER,
supra note 37; JOSEPH LEVINE & DAVID SUZUKI, THE SECRET OF LIFE: REDESIGNING THE LIVING
WORLD 122c ((1993) ("For better and for worse, every individual's genetic endowment is
determined at the moment of conception. Sperm and egg each carry a random selection of parental
genes. Their fusion creates a genetically unique individual."). "Fertilization, the moment the sperm
and egg fuse and a new individual begins to form, has been until recently shrouded in mystery."
LENNART NILSSON, A CHILD Is BORN 41 (1990).
45. CLINICAL OBSTETRICS 11 (Carl J. Pauerstein ed., 1987).
46. NILSSON, supra note 44, at 56.
47. On "metabolism," see 18 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 748 (Int'l ed. 1991).
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Skin and intestinal tissue, even eggs and sperm, are human life. But,
unlike such instances of human life, the embryo from the earliest
moment has the active capacity to articulate itself into what everyone
acknowledges is a human being. The embryo is a being; that is to
say, it is an integral whole with actual existence. The being is human;
it will not articulate itself into some other kind of animal. Any being
that is human is a human being. If it is objected that, at five days or
fifteen days, the embryo does not look like a human being, it must be
pointed out that this is precisely what a human being looks like-and
what each of us looked like-at five or fifteen days of development.4"
The question is not whether the developing human embryo looks like a mature
human being but whether its development is consistent with its human nature at
the particular stage of development.
While there is little biological doubt that the one-celled human zygote or
embryo is a separate, unique human being, in popular and legal discussions,
confusion often exists between human being and person. Human being is an
anthropological term that is based on biology and species, whereas "person" is
a moral or philosophical term. A human being is simply a member of the
species homo sapiens,9 and it is defined biologically, by species, not
developmentally. The distinction between "human life" and "human being" is
made clear by Bradley Patten and other human embryologists: "[a]lthough in
a sense, an embryo preexists in the gametes from which it arises, its life as a
new individual must be regarded as commencing at the moment of
fertilization."50 Patten emphasizes that "[it is the penetration of the ovum by
a sperm and the resultant mingling of the nuclear material each brings to the
union that constitutes the culmination of the process of fertilization and marks
the initiation of the life of a new individual. "s
48. The Ramsey Colloquium, The Inhuman Use of Human Beings: A Statement on Embryo
Research, FIRST THINGS, Jan. 1995, at 17, 17-18.
49. See, e.g., 14 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 545 (Int'l ed. 1991) ("Human Being.
Humankind is a species with a scientific name Homo sapiens"); 6 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA
(Micropaedia) 27 (15th ed. 1992) ("hominid, any creature of the family Hominidae (order Primates),
of which only one species exists today-Homo sapiens, or human beings"). Technically, the correct
term is homo sapiens sapiens. See 14 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 545, 545a (Int'l ed. 1992)
("Modem human beings are the only living representatives of H. sapiens and are referred to as the
subspecies H. sapiens sapiens."); id. at 545m.
50. See generally BRADLEY PATrEN, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY (3d ed. 1968).
51. C.E. CORLISS, PATTEN'S HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY: ELEMENTS OF CLINICAL DEVELOPMENT
30 (1976). See also ERNEST BLECHSCHMIDT, THE BEGINNING OF HUMAN LIFE 16-17 (1977) ("A
human ovum possesses human characteristics as genetic carriers, not chicken or fish. This is now
manifest; the evidence no longer allows a discussion as to if and when and in what month of
ontogenesis a human being is formed. To be a human being is decided for an organism at the
moment of fertilization of the ovum."); KEITH MOORE, THE DEVELOPING HUMAN: CLINICALLY
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The nature of the human being is thus formed at the time of fertilization.
The rest of life is simply the development or maturation of that essential nature.
Though imperfect or immature, it is still developing. Even at birth, human
development is incomplete, and the developing human is still utterly dependent
on other persons for basic survival. The time of development between
fertilization and birth is much less than the time of development between birth
and puberty, while the extent of development is much greater between
fertilization and birth than between birth and puberty. Sexual identity, for
example, is determined genetically at fertilization, although it is not complete
structurally until many years after birth. We are at least our genes, even if we
can be more than our genes. This is why, despite natural twinning and the
prospect of artificial cloning, we know that each human being is unique and
never to be repeated. At every stage of human life, each human has a
developing personality. Each has disabilities; each is developing. Yet, it is
always a difference of degree, not kind. The developing human embryo may
die, but it will not articulate itself into any other species.
The technology that has fostered IVF over the past twenty-five years, and
which makes possible somatic cell nuclear transfer (the cloning technique used
by Dr. Wilmut), has confirmed that the human embryo is a unique human being,
even while it has fostered experimentation on that embryo. While animal
husbandry and IVF have been used for some time, this technology has only
recently been applied to humans.52 And yet, as this technology is applied to
humans, the results conclusively demonstrate that human life begins with the
ORIENTED EMBRYOLOGY 1, 14 (3d ed. 1982) ("This cell [zygote] results from fertilization of an
oocyte, or ovum, by a sperm, or spermatozoon, and is the beginning of a human being.");
GREENHILL & FRIEDMAN, BIOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES AND MODERN PRACTICE OF OBsTETRICS 17
(1974) (the term "conception refers to the union of the male and female pronuclear elements of
procreation from which a new living being develops." Likewise, Leslie Arey emphasized in his
classic text that "[t]he formation, maturation and meeting of a male and female sex cell are all
preliminary to their actual union into a combined cell, or zygote, which definitely marks the
beginning of a new individual.") (emphasis in original).
52. See JACQUES COHEN ET AL., MICROMANIPULATION OF HUMAN GAMETES AND EMBRYOS
vii (1992); IN VITRO FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYO TRANSFER (Alan Trounson & Carl Wood eds.,
1984); CQ Interview: Voices from Roslin: The Creators of Dolly Discuss Science, Ethics, and
Social Responsibility with Arlene Judith Klotzko, 7 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 121, 122-
27 (1998) [hereinafter CQ Interview]. Jacques Cohen has stated:
Micromanipulation of preimplantation embryos, although only recently applied to
assisted human reproduction, has been practiced for decades by developmental biologists
and animal scientists .... Two main reasons exist for recent changes regarding the
application of micromanipulation techniques to human in vitro fertilization. First, an
overwhelming need for more precise control of the fertilization process has developed
.... Second, the advent of safe and reliable preconception and preimplantation genetic
diagnostic methods that pose no risk to embryonic viability may now allow for
replacement of genetically fit embryos in couples at risk for genetic disease.
COHEN, supra, at vii.
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fertilization of a human ovum by a human sperm and that human embryos are
individual members of the human species. These results also overturn medical
uncertainty and doubt about developing human life that traditionally burdened
law and medicine. The 1965 Life magazine issue that contained the well-known
detailed, color photographs of the human embryo, taken by Lennart Nilsson, and
the follow-up issue of Life in 1990, with even more advanced photographs,
demonstrate how modem technology can sweep away traditional medical
uncertainty.5 3 These recent technological advances have startling implications
for the legal protection of developing human life, though their meaning for the
legal protection of extracorporeal embryos has yet to be thoroughly explored.
III. THE SCIENCE OF HUMAN CLONING
The report of the Scottish sheep Dolly is not the first cloning "scare" in
America. Scientifically, cloning has progressed through many stages stretching
back over sixty years, and similar incidents of cloning were highly publicized
in the 1960s and 1970s. 4 Cloning is the stepchild of embryology. Although
the term was not used until the 1960s,55 the idea of cloning dates back to 1938
* and the human embryologist, Hans Spemann. The cloning of frog embryos was
first done by Robert Briggs and Thomas King in 195256 while adult frogs were
first cloned in 1962." 7 Frogs were first cloned because of the relative ease of
obtaining and manipulating a frog's eggs, which are large relative to human
eggs. Mammalian cells, in contrast, are much smaller and more difficult to
manipulate. Efforts to clone mice reportedly failed until 1979. The science was
daunting: how could nuclei be effectively removed from one cell? How could
a nucleus be transplanted into an ovum without damaging the nucleus or the
ovum?
In both the popular press and academic writings, cloning has been portrayed
as many different things, conjuring up many different prospects and supposed
dangers. At various times, the term "cloning" has been used to refer to gene
cloning, blastomere separation, somatic cell nuclear transfer, recombinant DNA
research, or simply artificially induced asexual reproduction. In its purest sense,
cloning means replication. It is important to distinguish between the cloning of
a gene and the cloning of an organism. Gene cloning means gene replication or
replacement and is part of a science, gene therapy, that has developed over the
past fifteen years. The science of gene therapy attempts to reverse or counteract
53. See NILSSON, supra note 44.
54. See KOLATA, supra note 2, at 67, 93.
55. See id.
56. Id. at 61-65; Robert Briggs & Thomas King, Transplantation of Living NucleifromBlastula
Cells into Enucleated Frogs' Eggs, 38 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sci. 455 (1952).
57. KOLATA, supra note 2, at 67.
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genetic diseases."8 The federally-funded Human Genome Project is closely
related to this developing science and is designed to map the 60,000-100,000
genes in the human body.59
In contrast to gene cloning, the recently publicized cloning of the sheep
Dolly involved the genetic replication of an entire organism. This was
purportedly the first cloning of a mammal from an adult cell.' Throughout the
remainder of this Article, the term "cloning" will refer to the replication of
entire organisms.
The cloning of entire organisms, especially mammals, may be performed
using two different techniques with different implications. One technique is
called blastomere separation or "cloning by embryo splitting. "61 This involves
splitting the cells of a human embryo at its earliest stages of development, a
method of artificially creating a twin. Each cell at this early stage is
undifferentiated and totipotent-individually able to grow into a mature embryo,
and then a fetus, leading to birth. The cloning of human embryos that was
reported in October 1993 was achieved by blastomere separation.62 This
method avoids the spector of replicating a dead or living adult human being.
In contrast, the second cloning technique that reportedly resulted in the
Scottish sheep is called "nuclear transfer" (or transplantation), a term which
effectively describes the basic procedure. This may be attempted using
embryonic or adult cells. This technique has also been called (in the bills
introduced in Congress) somatic cell nuclear transfer, which refers to the use of
genetic material from non-germ (non-sex) cells. The female's genetic material
is contained in the nucleus of the ovum (the egg cell). The nucleus from an egg
is removed (enucleated egg) and replaced with the nucleus from a cell of the
human being to be cloned. The unfertilized egg is artificially fertilized by
replacing its nucleus. Leon Kass has described the procedure as follows:
58. See generally JEFF LYON & PETER GORNER, ALTERED FATES: GENE THERAPY AND THE
RETOOLING OF HUMAN LIFE (1995); EVE K. NICHOLS, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, HUMAN GENE THERAPY (1988).
59. See generally Human Genome Project: An International Investigation into Heredity, 77
CONG. DIG. 39 (1998).
60. Nearly a year after the Scottish sheep cloning report was made public, some biologists and
scientists questioned the validity of the report. Wade, supra note 4, at AS. See also Jerome P.
Kassirer & Nadia A. Rosenthal, Should Human Cloning Be Off Limits?, 338 N. ENG. 1. MED. 905
(1998); Vittorio Sgaramella & Norton D. Zinder, Letter to Editor, 279 SCI. 635, 636 (1998);
Nicholas Wade, Cloner of a Sheep Moves to Persuade the Skeptics, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1998, at
A6 (Nat'l ed.).
61. See National Advisory Board on Ethics in Reproduction, Report on Human Cloning
Through Embryo Splitting: An AmberLight, 4 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 251-82 (1994); Robertson,
Question, supra note 17, at 6.
62. See Robertson, Question, supra note 17, at 6.
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The nucleus of a mature but unfertilized egg is removed and replaced
with a nucleus obtained from a specialized cell of an adult (or fetal)
organism (in Dolly's case, the donor nucleus came from mammary
gland epithelium). Since almost all the hereditary material of a cell is
contained within its nucleus, the renucleated egg and the individual
into which this egg develops are genetically identical to the organism
that was the source of the transferred nucleus. . . . With laboratory
cultivation and storage of tissues, cells outliving their sources make it
possible even to clone the dead.'
This technique of human cloning, like IYF, is conducted extracorporeally-
outside the human body, in a laboratory. As with IVF, only after the human
egg is denucleated, the nucleus replaced, and the resulting embryo is allowed to
divide would it be implanted in a woman's uterus. Only then would a normal
pregnancy exist. Cloning by somatic cell nuclear transfer (in contrast to other
techniques) was the exclusive focus of the 1997 National Bioethics Advisory
Commission (NBAC) hearings and report. 6O
The cloning of a human by nuclear transfer is, therefore, essentially
artificially conceiving an identical twin. Identical (monozygotic) twins, as their
name indicates, come from the fertilization of a single ovum that subsequently
divides into two embryos of the same sex which are genetically identical. Non-
identical (fraternal or dizygotic) twins, by contrast, come from the fertilization
of more than one ovum and thus share only fifty percent of their genes. In
natural sexual reproduction, a human ovum (with twenty-three chromosomes)
is fertilized by a human sperm (with twenty-three chromosomes), thus
combining the male and female genetic material. With somatic cell nuclear
transfer, the genetic material of the ovum (with twenty-three chromosomes) is
removed from the cell and replaced with a nucleus containing the full
complement of forty-six chromosomes, the complete genetic material of a single
human being.
Though genetically identical, a clone would not be identical in all ways,
such as physical appearance. Genes do not entirely determine a human being's
biological makeup. Environmental factors also play an important, yet uncertain,
role. Geneticists distinguish between genotype (the genetic constitution of an
63. Kass, Wisdom of Repugnance, supra note 23, at 18-19. Strictly speaking, monozygotic
twins are not exact copies, nor would the product of cloning be, due to mutations, chemical
exposure, etc. For example, the fingerprints of identical twins are not identical.
64. See NBAC REPORT, supra note 5.
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organism) and phenotype (the observable expression of the interaction of the
organism's genetic structure and the environment). Cloning may result in a
genetically identical individual (having the same genotype), but the phenotype
(the observable expression of the genotype) of the cloned individual might well
be different.
The key scientific challenges are whether cloning from an adult cell (rather
than an embryonic cell) can be done, whether it can be done in mammals, and
whether it can be done in humans particularly. The cloning of mammals using
fetal or embryonic cells is generally accepted as having been achieved. Part of
the amazement surrounding the report of the cloning of the Scottish sheep was
that the sheep was reportedly cloned from the cells of an adult sheep. The
scientific barrier to cloning from an adult cell is related to the specialization or
differentiation of cells. Can the genetic material in an adult cell, after the cell
has become specialized ("fully differentiated cells"), be used to spur the
development of an entirely new entity? Can the specialized adult cell nucleus
spur complete, normal development in the ovum, or will it simply spur
replication of the specialized cell (e.g., nerve cells, bone cells)? John Eppig,
a developmental biologist from the Jackson Laboratory in Bar Harbor, Maine,
and a member of NBAC, stated that "[i]f the egg is not activated with the
proper signaling mechanisms, then the embryo might not reach an implantation
stage, or it might not have the proper proportions of cells in order to support
normal development. . . . I would be very concerned about the health of the
fetus and the health of the baby that would come from this."'6
IV. HUMAN CLONING AND THE
LEGAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN LIFE
The legal issues surrounding human cloning research in the United States
are the grandchildren of the Supreme Court's 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade,'
which legalized abortion for any reason, at any time of pregnancy, in every
state. 67 Legalized abortion fostered IVF and embryo experimentation, which
now have led to cloning. IVF technology was first widely publicized in 1978
with the birth of Louise Brown, the first "test tube baby," in Britain.' IVF
typically involves the fertilization of a number of eggs resulting in several
embryos in hopes of successfully implanting at least one in a woman's uterus,
and IVF researchers conduct embryo experimentation in order to increase the
success rates of IVF. Human cloning, in a sense, is a type of IVF and will
65. Reuters, Chicago Scientist Plans Human Cloning (Jan. 6, 1998) <http://www.d-
b.net/dtil/980106seed.txt>.
66. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
67. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973). See infra note 245.
68. KOLATA, supra note 2, at 10-11.
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inevitably involve embryo experimentation. 69 Hence, the legal status of the
human embryo is directly relevant to constitutional issues affecting human
cloning.
For much of the public and for most scholars, the legal and moral status of
the unborn human being begins and ends with Roe v. Wade. Even legal
commentators who write on the legal status of the human embryo commonly
demonstrate only the most superficial understanding of the history of legal
protection of the unborn human.70 For example, in justifying human cloning
and "the manipulation and destruction of embryos that cloning research, if not
the procedure itself, will inevitably cause," Professor John A. Robertson, a
leading advocate for reproductive technologies including cloning, contends that
there is a "prevailing moral and legal consensus that views early embryos as too
rudimentary in neurological development to have interests or rights.""
Whether such a consensus truly exists to support cloning or cloning research
requires a detailed review of American legal history and contemporary
legislation and caselaw. Hence, the history of the legal protection of developing
human life is important because it shapes substantive due process, informs the
limits of Roe v. Wade, and undergirds protection for the developing human
being in non-abortion circumstances even today.
69. NBAC REPORT, supra note 5, at 29-32.
70. Cf. 1 WILUAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *125 (the right to life is "a right inherent
by nature in every individual; and it begins in contemplation of law as soon as an infant is able to
stir in the mother's womb"), and John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty:
The Legal Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 942, 973 (1986) [hereinafter
Robertson, Embryos] (stating that "[w]ith the exception of former laws that prohibited abortion, the
law has never regarded fetuses as rights-bearing entities"). See John A. Robertson, In the
Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos, 76 VA. L. REV. 437, 450 n.38 (1990) [hereinafter
Robertson, Beginning] (citing four articles for "early accounts of legal status" of the human embryo,
all of which contain only a sketchy, incomplete, and superficial review of the history of the legal
protection for the developing human: Lori B. Andrews, The Legal Status of the Embryo, 32 LOY.
L. REV. 357, 361 (1986) (citing Roe v. Wade for the legal status of the human embryo in history);
Patricia A. King, The Juridical Status of the Fetus: A Proposal for Legal Protection of the Unborn,
77 MICH. L. REV. 1647, 1657-1664 (1979) (confusing birth with viability); Robertson, Embryos,
supra, at 971-75 (citing no history or the current state of the law); Marcia Joy Wurnbrand, Note,
Frozen Embryos: Moral, Social, andLegal Implications, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1079, 1088-95 (1986)
(citing Robertson, Embryos, supra, and John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of
Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405 (1983) [hereinafter Robertson,
Procreative Liberty]).
71. Robertson, Question, supra note 17, at 6.
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A. Common Law Protection of Human Life
In Anglo-American jurisprudence, the law that protected the inviolability
of human life, stretching back at least seven centuries to the ancient origins of
the common law, is the law of homicide. In applying homicide law exclusively
to human beings and to no other species, Anglo-American law has demonstrated
that it has always considered human beings, that is, the human species, special.
In American law, a fundamental distinction has always existed between the
human species and every other species.
Relating this to the American political culture, the principle of natural rights
of human beings, the equal creation of human beings, and the inalienability of
the right to life is deeply imbedded in the American political and legal tradition.
The founding political document of the United States, the Declaration of
Independence, proclaims that all are created equal and endowed by their Creator
with certain inalienable rights, including a right to life. The founding generation
considered these basic principles as self-evident truths.'
At common law, homicide law provided very broad protection to human
life-extending its protection to "the killing of any human creature," according
to William Blackstone, the leading authority on the common law.73 The
modem debate over the moral status of the human embryo, however, typically
disregards the fact that homicide law protects human beings, not persons. This
disregard evidences a confusion of the Fourteenth Amendment (and the Court's
discussion of "person" in Roe v. Wade) with the criminal code.74 Homicide
law does not protect only mature or developed persons, but all human beings,
that is, all offspring of human parents. It is species-directed. In effect, Roe v.
72. See generally MORTON G. WHITE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
(1977); HARRY V. JAFFA, CRISIS OF THE HOUSE DIVIDED (1959); Clarke D. Forsythe, The Legacy
of Oliver Wendall Holmes, 69 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 677, 696-97 (1992).
73. See also 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 70, at *188 (defining "Felonious homicide" as "the
killing of a human creature"); 6 THE NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 26 (15th ed. 1995)
("homicide, the killing of one human being by another"). 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 70, at *177
("homicide, or the killing of any human creatures").
74. For a good example of sowing confusion while claiming to alleviate it, see Robertson,
Beginning, supra note 70, at 444 n.24 ("The abortion debate has often been confused by loose use
of terms such as person, human life, human being, etc. Clearly the fertilized egg, embryo, and fetus
are human and are living. The question is whether they merit the moral protection accorded to
clearly defined persons.").
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Wade merely created a constitutional exception to the general rule when it
stipulated that legal protection of the unborn may not interfere with a woman's
right to "terminate pregnancy." Even if a human being were not a "person"
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, and thus without
constitutional protection, that same human being may be protected under state
homicide law.75
The Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade and almost all contemporary
scholarship surrounding abortion and reproduction ignore the intimate,
inextricable relationship between law and medical science. That intimate
relationship is evidenced in the historical development of legal protection for
unborn human life and how advances in medical knowledge resulted in practical
legal protection.76 If the unborn human could not be viewed, how could it be
determined to be dead or alive? If it could not be determined to be dead or
alive, how could it be determined whether it was killed or died from natural
causes? These questions are rarely asked or answered by legal commentators,
who instead start with only the incomplete and superficial account of legal
history given in Roe v. Wade.'
The common law protected unborn human life to the greatest extent
possible given contemporary medical knowledge and had direct antecedents in
the Roman civil law's protection of the unborn child from the time the mother
was known to conceive.78 The law was directly informed by medicine, and
legal protection was limited or extended by the contemporary state of medical
knowledge. The right to life, according to Blackstone, was "a right inherent by
nature in every individual; and it begins in contemplation of law as soon as an
infant is able to stir in the mother's womb."" But what was most important
was not "personhood," but the unborn's status as a "human creature." In the
face of the contemporary limitations of medical knowledge and evidence, every
consideration was given to protect the life and rights of the unborn human.
Thus, as Blackstone wrote, "[a]n infant in ventre sa mere, or in the mother's
womb, is supposed in law to be born for many purposes."' That English
medical-legal authorities considered abortion at any stage of gestation to be the
75. See infra notes 136-49 and accompanying text.
76. See sources cited supra note 70.
77. For a collection of citations and criticisms of the legal history proferred in Roe, see Dennis
J. Horan et al., Two Ships Passing in the Night: An Interpretavist Review of the White-Stevens
Colloquy on Roe v. Wade, 6 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 229, 230 n.8, 241 n.90 (1987).
78. See, e.g., Horan et al., supra note 77, at 276 & n.276 (citing the writings of Paulus and
Marcianus in Corpus Juris Civilis).
79. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 70, at *125.
80. Id. at 126. See also Stemmer v. Kline, 19 N.J. Misc. 15, 17 A.2d 58, 59 (1940) ("The
child was at common law a separate entity entitled to the recognition and protection of our courts.
At common law such a child was recognized as a person.").
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taking of human life (and thus a crime) influenced the nineteenth century
development of English legislation.8' As Glanville Williams observed, with
Lord Ellenborough's Act of 1803, Parliament "made not merely a legal
pronouncement but an ethical or metaphysical one, namely that human life has
a value from the moment of impregnation."' Why these laws arose in the
nineteenth century, and not before or after, is clear: Parliament only then
learned of the medical evidence concerning human development.83
Authoritative legal treatises and materials consistently referred to the unborn
human being as a "child" or an "unborn child," references that stretch back
over centuries and give further evidence of the protection Anglo-American
jurisprudence gave to the unborn human being. At common law, the unborn
human being was commonly called a "child" without regard to the time of
gestation." For centuries, Fleta- Staunford, Lambarde, Dalton, Coke,
Blackstone, Hawkins, and Hale used this term.' This is also seen in the
common phrase, being "with child."' Early texts on midwifery, medicine,
and jurisprudence used the term "child" to refer to the unborn at any 'stage of
pregnancy.' In sharp contrast, the common law term "unborn child" is rarely
used in contemporary scholarship, because its use would essentially predetermine
the question at issue-the moral and legal status of the unborn human.
Though limited by contemporary medicine, American law incorporated this
general rule of protection. Thus, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
stated, "To many purposes, in reference to civil rights, an infant in ventre sa
mere is regarded as a person in being."" Or, as the New Jersey Supreme
Court stated in 1849, "[i]t is true that, for certain civil purposes, the law regards
an infant as in being from the time of conception .... "-9
81. JOHN KEOWN, ABORTION, DOCTORS AND THE LAW 26-48 (1988).
82. GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 227 (1957).
83. KEOWN, supra note 81, at 26-48.
84. See, e.g., 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 70, at *450 ("his child, either born or unborn").
85. Horan et al., supra note 77, at 289-91 & nn.359-78.
86. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 70, at *446 ("declares herself with child").
87. Horan et al., supra note 77, at 290 n.369; Clarke D. Forsythe, Homicide of the Unborn
Child: The Born Alive Rule and Other Legal Anachronisms, 21 VAL. U. L. REV. 563 (1987).
88. Commonwealth v. Parker, 50 Mass. 263, 266 (1845) (citing 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note
70, at *129).
89. State v. Cooper, 22 N.J. 52, 56 (1849). The court finished this statement by saying that
"yet it seems no where to regard it as in life, or to have respect to its preservation as a living
being." Id. at 56-57. The distinction here is due to the difference between different burdens of
proof in civil and criminal law, as well as the evidentiary issues involved.
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1. Quickening as an Evidentiary Line
Nevertheless, the common law would protect the life of a "human creature"
only when it could be demonstrated to be alive. Due to the limitations of
contemporary medical knowledge, a conflict between the declaration of rights
and the extent of practical protection existed. Thus, Blackstone could declare
that the right to life commenced at the first contemporary evidence of life
(quickening), but the practical application of the law of homicide required live
birth and subsequent death in order to provide necessary evidence of the corpus
delicti of homicide.'
For centuries, "quickening"-the time when the mother first feels fetal
movements-was regarded as the most reliable medical evidence of life. Based
on the medical knowledge of the day, the ancient common law adopted the
presumption that the fetus first became alive at quickening.9 At the earliest
time of the common law, in the thirteenth century, the legal authorities, Bracton
and Fleta, held that the killing of a "quickened child" in the womb was
homicide without any explicit requirement of live birth.92 From the fourteenth
through the nineteenth centuries, "quickening" was the only reliable evidence
that a woman was pregnant or that the unborn human being was alive. Texts
of midwifery (the forerunner to obstetrics) typically contained chapters on the
"signs of pregnancy," in which quickening was emphasized. 93 As late as 1800,
a standard text on midwifery concluded that "there appears to be no unequivocal
sign, whereby that state [of pregnancy] can with certainty be determined, till
between the fourth and fifth months, when the child quickens, that is, when its
motions are distinctly felt."" In 1829, Thomas Denman, a widely cited
authority on the subject, expressed the developing understanding of quickening:
90. Cf. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 70, at *125, and 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 70, at *198.
91. Horan et al., supra note 77, at 279-80 (collecting authorities); Forsythe, supra note 87, at
571-74 nn.39-53 (collecting authorities).
92. Horan et al., supra note 77, at 285 & n.338. For a description of the common law history
of legal protection of the unborn, see Robert Bryn, An American Tragedy: The Supreme Court on
Abortion, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 807 (1973); Joseph Dellapenna, The History of Abortion:
Technology, Morality and Law, 40 U. PITT. L. REV. 359 (1979); Robert Destro, Abortion and the
Constitution: The Need for a Life-Protective Amendment, 63 CAL. L. REV. 1250 (1975); Forsythe,
supra note 87; Shelley Gavigan, The Criminal Sanction as It Relates to Human Reproduction: The
Genesis of the Statutory Prohibition of Abortion, 5 J. LEGAL HIsT. 20 (1984); Horan et al., supra
note 77, at 278-300; Philip A. Rafferty, Roe v. Wade: The Birth of a Constitutional Right (Ph.D.
dissertation 1992) (U.M.I. Dissertation Services); Mark Scott, Note, Quickening in the Common
Law: The Legal Precedent Roe Attempted and Fdiled to Use, 1 MICH. LAW & POL. REV. 199, 218-
42, 251-63, 265 (1996).
93. See Forsythe, supra note 87, at 571 n.42, 572-73.
94. VALENTINE SEAMAN, THE MIDWIVES MONITOR AND THE MOTHER'S MIRROR 70-72 (1800).
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The changes which follow quickening have been attributed to various
causes. By some it has been conjectured, that the child then acquired
a new mode of existence; or that it was arrived to such a size as to be
able to dispense with the menstrous blood, before retained in the
constitution of the parent, which it disturbed by its quantity or
malignity. But it is not now suspected, that there is any difference
between the aboriginal life of the child, and that which it possesses at
any period of pregnancy, though there may be an alteration in the
proofs of its existence, by the enlargement of its size, and the
acquisition of greater strength."
John Beck, in his Elements of Medical Jurisprudence-one of the primary
authorities in the nineteenth century-emphasized the same understanding:
It is important to understand the sense attached to this word
[quickening] formerly, and at the present day. The ancient opinion,
on which indeed the laws of some countries have been founded, was,
that the foetus became animated at this period-that it acquired a new
mode of existence. This is altogether abandoned. The foetus is
certainly, if we speak physiologically, as much a living being
immediately after conception, as at any other time before delivery; and
its future progress is but the development and increase of those
constituent principles which it then received.'
Wharton and Stille confirmed the same proposition:
This symptom [quickening] was formerly given much weight, because
at that time the child was supposed to receive its spiritual nature-to
become animate. Such ideas have now become entirely obsolete in the
scientific world. The time perfecting the child is at its conception.
After then, in all ways, it is merely a question of growth and
development. 91
As medical knowledge grew, the quickening rule was criticized and
eventually abandoned. Two of the most prestigious criminal law scholars of the
nineteenth century, Bishop and Wharton, criticized the quickening rule,
concluding that abortion was a crime at common law regardless of the stage of
95. THOMAS DENMAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRACTICE OF MIDWIFERY 287 (3d ed.
1829).
96. 1 JOHN BECK, ELEMENTS OF MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 276 (11th ed. 1860).
97. 3 WHARTON & STILLE'S MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 7 (5th ed. 1905).
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gestation.9" Wharton's discussion revealed the dynamic between medical
evidence and the increasing protection for unborn human life:
There is no doubt that at common law the destruction of an infant
unborn is a high misdemeanor, and at an early period it seems to have
been deemed murder. If the child dies subsequently to birth from
wounds received in the womb, it is clearly homicide, even though the
child is still attached to the mother by the umbilical cord. It has been
said that it is not an indictable offense to administer a drug to a
woman, and thereby to procure an abortion, unless the mother is quick
with child, though such a distinction, it is submitted, is neither in
accordance with the result of medical experience, nor with the
principles of the common law. The civil rights of an infant in ventre
sa mere are equally respected at every stage of gestation . . . . It
appears, then, that quickening is a mere circumstance in the
physiological history of the foetus, which indicates neither the
commencement of a new stage of existence, nor an advance from one
stage to another .... There is as much vitality, in a physical point
of view, on one side of quickening as on the other, and in a social and
moral point of view, the infant is as much entitled to protection, and
society is as likely to be injured by its destruction, a week before it
quickens as a week afterwards."
As Wharton intimates, substantial common law authority exists
demonstrating that killing the developing human being was a crime at common
law without regard to quickening and without regard to the time of gestation.
As the highest court in Maryland stated in 1887,
as the life of an infant was not supposed to begin until it stirred in the
mother's womb [quickening], it was not regarded as a criminal offense
to commit an abortion in the early stages of pregnancy. A
considerable change in the law has taken place in many jurisdictions
by the silent and steady progress of judicial opinion; and it has been
frequently held by Courts of high character that abortiofi is a.crime at
common law without regard to the stage of gestation."°
The number of centuries during which the legal protection of the unborn
was burdened by the limitations of medical knowledge dwarf the relatively few,
recent years during which heightened medical knowledge has allowed in utero
98. JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, BISHOP ON STATUTORY CRIMES § 744, at 447 (2d ed. 1883);
FRANCES WHARTON, AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW §§ 1220-30, at 210-18 (6th rev. ed. 1868).
99. WHARTON, supra note 98, § 1220-30 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
100. Lamb v. State, 10 A. 208, 208 (Md. Ct. App. 1887).
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treatment and surgery.' 0 ' Today, for reasons of medical advancement,
quickening "provides only corroborative evidence of pregnancy and in itself is
of little diagnostic value."10i0
2. The Significance of the Born Alive Rule
Today, the born alive rule, which originated around 1600, is erroneously,
but commonly, thought to be a rule of morality or moral philosophy, denoting
the "personhood" of the born child and the non-personhood of the unborn child.
This misconception of the born alive rule is largely derived from the Supreme
Court's misconstruction of that rule in Roe v. Wade.
103
In reality, the born alive rule was a rule of medical jurisprudence, a bright-
line rule of evidence, used to eliminate cases of uncertain evidence in the killing
of a child. 4 One leading nineteenth century legal authority described the
purpose of the born alive rule as follows:
It is well known that in the course of nature, many children come into
the world dead, and that others die from various causes soon after
birth. In the latter, the signs of their having lived are frequently
indistinct. Hence, to provide against the danger of erroneous
accusations, the law humanely presumes that every newborn child has
been born dead, until the contrary appears from medical or other
evidence. The onus of proof is thereby thrown on the prosecution;
and no evidence imputing murder can be received, unless it be made
certain by medical or other facts, that the child survived its birth and
was actually living when the violence was offered to it. °W
That the born alive rule was evidentiary is clear from its application in
criminal cases: if injury was inflicted on the child in utero at any stage of
gestation, and death came outside the womb, a homicide could be charged. As
a renowned nineteenth century legal commentator, Walter Russell, stated the
rule:
101. The novelty of medical technology that allows treatment and visualization of the unborn
human being was highlighted by the famous Swedish photographer, Lennart Nilsson: "New
technology has made it possible to see the actual events surrounding fertilization and to visualize the
growing fetus more clearly. At the same time, new medical knowledge has reduced the risks of
pregnancy ... ." NILSSON, supra note 44, at 15.
102. F. GARY CUNNINGHAM ET AL., WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 13 (18th ed. 1989).
103. See generally Forsythe, supra note 87.
104. Id.; Horan et al., supra note 77, at 285-88.
105. ALFRED S. TAYLOR, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 411 (7th ed. 1861).
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If a person intending to procure abortion does an act which causes a
child to be born so much earlier than the natural time that it is born
in a state much less capable of living, and afterwards dies in
consequence of its exposure to the external world, the person who by
her misconduct so brings the child into the world, and puts it thereby
into a situation in which it cannot live, is guilty of murder."
The born alive rule demonstrated the congruence between the child before
and after birth and treated the child, before and after birth, as the same entity.
Thus, the law held that injury in the womb and death outside the womb were
inflicted on the same entity. Had the born alive rule been a moral rule denoting
"personhood" at birth, the law would not recognize any injury unless it was
inflicted after birth. Russell's explication shows both the evidentiary nature of
the born alive rule and the irrelevance of viability and demonstrates that the born
alive rule recognized biological and existential continuity, at any stage of
gestation, between the unborn and born child.
Under the traditional application of the born alive rule, as Russell indicates,
the killing of an early, developing human being was still considered a homicide
if the assault on the mother resulted, at any stage of development, in a
miscarriage that produced expulsion of the child from the womb and death after
that expulsion. In the course of things, the unborn human being might not
survive the initial assault or the miscarriage, but if it did, the law of homicide
did not consider how premature the human being was, as long as it survived
expulsion from the womb and was observed outside.
The Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade completely misunderstood the subtle
dynamic of the born alive rule. The Court-apparently in complete ignorance
and without any warrant or citation of authority-converted the born alive rule
from an evidentiary rule dependent on location (in or out of the womb) into a
gestational rule (full-term). This is clear when the Court declared that the rights
of persons do not begin until "birth"-directly contrary to Blackstone-and then
concluded that this meant "term birth"-after the third trimester.
0 7
The common law demonstrates, to the contrary, that a dynamic relationship
existed between law and medicine with regard to the status and protection of the
unborn child. As medical knowledge of human development increased, legal
protection increased. The law always considered the offspring of human parents
106. 2 WALTER RUSSELL, A TREATISE ON CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 671-72 (Garland Pub.
reprint 1979) (1865).
107. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
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to be a human being, and the law considered the unborn child to be a human
being whenever it could be determined to be alive. Evidence of life-a living
human being-was what was important for legal protection, not "personhood."
The modern debate about "personhood" essentially began with the Supreme
Court's consideration of the Fourteenth Amendment liberty clause (protecting
"persons") in Roe and with subsequent philosophic discussions about Roe. But,
to the extent that Blackstone considered the status of the unborn child within his
chapter on the rights of persons, it is clear that the common law regarded every
living "human creature" to be a person. The common law protected unborn
human life to the greatest extent possible given contemporary medical
knowledge.' That protection encompassed living members of the human
species and did not inquire into "personhood."
3. The Insignificance of Viability
The common law placed significance on two phenomena: quickening and
live birth. Viability, in contrast, was never a concern of the common law, 10
9
and it played no role in the development of the common law concerning the
unborn child." 0 A leading nineteenth century legal authority confirmed this:
The English law does not act on the principle that a child, in order to
become the subject of a charge of murder, shouldbe born viable, i.e.,
with the capacity to live .... The capacity of a child continuing to
live has never been put as a medical question in a case of alleged child
murder; and it is pretty certain, that if a want of capacity to live were
actually proved, this would not render the party destroying it
irresponsible for the offense.''
It was generally recognized at common law that a pre-viable "child" (to use
Taylor's term) could be born alive and that killing it was considered
homicide. 12
In American law, the concept of viability began as a judicially-imposed
gloss in a 1884 opinion by Oliver Wendell Holmes for the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court in Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton. "I The
108. Scott, supra note 92, at 261, 265 (stating that legal protection was extended to "a living
member of the human species"). See also 4 ROSCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 386 n.60 (1959).
109. See Horan et al., supra note 77, at 281-82 n.306-11 (collecting authorities); 4 POUND,
supra note 108, at 386 n.60.
110. Forsythe, supra note 87, at 569 & n.33.
111. TAYLOR, supra note 105, at 413. The leading English case was Regina v. West, 2 C. &
K. 784, 175 Eng. Rep. 329 (1848).
112. Forsythe, supra note 87, at 568 & n.28.
113. 138 Mass. 14, 16 (1884).
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court in Dietrich denied recovery for the death of a child born alive but
premature after a miscarriage and created a viability requirement for civil
recovery that had no basis in statute or common law."'
Some American courts followed Dietrich in civil cases for nearly fifty
years. But, with developing medical knowledge in the twentieth century and the
1946 decision in Bonbrest v. Kotz,'s American courts increasingly rejected the
viability rule, until the Supreme Court's Roe decision in 1973. That decision
reversed the erosion of the viability rule and instead placed great emphasis on
viability. Relying on Roe, some state courts, even outside the context of
abortion, have limited legal protection for the unborn to viability.1 1 6  More
recently, other courts have recognized that Roe-and its emphasis on
viability-does not apply outside the context of abortion."
7
B. Modern Criminal and Tort Law Developments
1. Tort Law
Modern analyses of the tort law's protection for the unborn human being
rarely notice that the common law did not allow recovery for the death of any
human being, born or unborn."' While this unavailability of recovery for
born human beings is never used to suggest that born human beings are not
"persons" at common law, the lack of a remedy for unborn human beings is
often taken to mean that they are not "persons." The fact of the matter is that
modern tort law recovery for the death of bom human beings has been a matter
of legislative grace and judicial application or extension of that remedy, and with
an increase of medical knowledge, these legal developments have encompassed
the unborn.
114. For a thorough critique of Dietrich, see Forsythe, supra note 72, at 685-89. Ironically,
one biographer states that "Holmes undoubtedly would have given the common law meaning to the
term 'person' in the federal [F]ourteenth [A]mendment," under the erroneous assumption that
viability was the "common law" definition of "person." Sheldon M. Novick, Justice Holmes ahd
Roe v. Wade, TRIAL, Dec. 1989, at 58. See also SHELDON M. NOViCK, HONORABLE JUSTICE: THE
LIFE OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES (1990). The underlying assumption that the language of the
Constitution is appropriately read with reference to common law terms is correct, as the Court has
often done. But, as Blackstone makes clear, the common law meaning of "person" encompassed
an unborn human being at the earliest point that it could be determined to be biologically alive and
had no reference to viability. Effectuation of this principle was practically limited by medical
evidence.
115. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
116. See, e.g., State v. Gyles, 313 So. 2d 799 (La. 1975).
117. People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591 (Cal. 1994).
118. See, e.g., Dougherty v. American McKenna Process Co., 99 N.E. 619 (Il. 1912).
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The Supreme Court in Roe misrepresented the development of tort law in
its protection of the unborn child," 9 violating the first rule of the legal
historian: to understand the past on its own terms.10 As Professor Kader has
shown, Roe erroneously described the state of the law's protection of unborn
human life.' According to Kader, Roe's mistaken discussion of the legal
status of the unborn in tort law... "was perfunctory, and unfortunately largely
inaccurate, and should not be relied upon as the correct view of the law at the
time of Roe v. Wade." "
The Court in Roe cited William Prosser to support its erroneous assertion
that courts had granted recovery for prenatal injuries only where the fetus was
viable or at least "quick." In fact, Prosser stated just the opposite, noting that
most states permitted recovery for prenatal injuries regardless of the stage of
gestation in which the injuries were inflicted:
Most of the cases allowing recovery have involved a foetus which was
then viable . . . . Many of them have said, by way of dictum, that
recovery must be limited to such cases, and two or three have said that
the child, if not viable, must at least be "quick." But when actually
119. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
120. As the late legal historian, George Haskins, has written:
The task of the historian of law is not merely one of recounting the growth and
jurisdiction of courts and legislatures or of detailing the evolution of legal rules and
doctrines. It is essential that these matters be related to the political and social
environments of particular times and places. Broadly conceived, legal history is
concerned with determining how certain types of rules, which we call law, grew out of
past social, economic, and psychological conditions, and how they accorded with or
accomodated themselves thereto.
GEORGE HASKINS, LAW AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY MASSACHUSETrs viii (1960).
121. David Kader, The Law of Tortious Prenatal Death Since Roe v. Wade, 45 MO. L. REV.
639 (1980). See Roe, 410 U.S. at 162:
In a recent development, generally opposed by the commentators, some states permit
the parents of a stillborn child to maintain an action for wrongful death because of
prenatal injuries. Such an action, however, would appear to be one to vindicate the
parents' interest and is thus consistent with the view that the fetus, at most, represents
only the potentiality of life. Similarly, unborn children have been recognized as
acquiring rights or interests by way of inheritance or other devolution of property, and
have been represented by guardians ad litem. Perfection of the interests involved, again,
has generally been contingent upon live birth. In short, the unborn have never been
recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
122. Kader, supra note 121, at 652-53. See also William R. Hopkin, Jr., Comment, Roe v.
Wade and the Traditional Legal Standards Concerning Pregnancy, 47 TEMP. L.Q. 715 (1974).
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faced with the issue for decision, almost all of the jurisdictions have
allowed recovery even though the injury occurred during the early
weeks of pregnancy, when the child was neither viable nor quick. 123
Prosser also explained both the evidentiary reasons for the born alive rule
in tort law prior to 1946 and the advancements in medical science that
eliminated its rationale:
When a pregnant woman is injured, and as a result the child
subsequently born suffers deformity or some other injury, nearly all
of the decisions prior to 1946 denied recovery to the child. Two
reasons usually were given: First, that the defendant could owe no
duty of conduct to a person who was not in existence at the time of his
action; and second, that the difficulty of proving any causal connection
between negligence and damage was too great, and there was too
much danger of fictitious claims.
So far as duty is concerned, if existence at the time is necessary,
medical authority has recognized long since that the child is in
existence from the moment of conception, and for many purposes its
existence is recognized by the law. . . . So far as causation is
concerned, there will certainly be cases in which there are difficulties
of proof, but they are no more frequent, and the difficulties, are no
greater, than as to many other medical problems. All writers who
have discussed the problem have joined in condemning the old rule,
in maintaining that the unborn child in the path of an automobile is as
much a person in the street as the mother, and in urging that recovery
should be allowed upon proper proof.'24
Two years before Roe, Professor David Louisell summarized the law regarding
the unborn:
[Tihe progress of the law in recognition of the fetus as a human
person has been strong and steady and roughly proportional to the
growth of knowledge of biology and embryology. For centuries the
law of property has recognized the unborn as living persons and the
criminal law, although unevenly, has accorded them substantial
protection. The law of torts, because of biological misconceptions
123. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 337 (4th ed. 1971) (footnotes
omitted).
124. Id. at 335-36 (footnotes omitted). See also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 367-72 (5th ed. 1984); WILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TORTS 421-36 (9th ed. 1994).
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among judges and practical difficulties of medical proof, was
something of a laggard, but since World War II there has been an
explosive recognition "that the unborn child in the path of an
automobile is as much a person in the street as the mother." . . . In
a word, the unborn child is a person to be protected in his property
rights and against negligence, and to be afforded the reach of equity's
affirmative arm for support and sustenance. '
Although the Supreme Court in 1973 virtually abolished abortion law, Roe
did not touch assaults on the unborn child outside the context of abortion. Roe
stifled an ongoing process of increasing state protection for unborn human life
through state criminal and tort law.' 26 But, despite Roe, that progressive
procdss has continued outside the immediate context of abortion. 2 7  The
upshot of this progressive protection in both tort and criminal law has been an
increasing abolition of the obsolete born alive rule and a growth in protection
of the unborn child, even if stillborn, without regard to the stage of gestation.
In tort law, today, virtually all states allow suits for prenatal injuries for
children later born alive. (Obviously, if the child is not born alive, the suit
would be for wrongful death.) A majority of state courts have expressly or
implicitly rejected viability as a limitation on liability for nonfatal prenatal
injuries.' As recently as 1993, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court pointed out
that "no jurisidictiopi accepts the. . . assertion that a child must be viable at the
time of birth in order to maintain an action in wrongful death" (where the child
is born alive and dies thereafter).' 29 Some states, by statute, have eliminated
gestational time limits for recovery for injury or death to the unborn child. "3
125. Louisell, supra note 17, at 19-20 (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS 355 (3d ed. 1964)) (footnotes omitted).
126. Some courts concluded that Roe prevented protection of the unborn child even outside the
context of abortion. See, e.g., State v. Gyles, 313 So. 2d 799 (La. 1975). But that erroneous
understanding has been abandoned in recent years. See, e.g., People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591 (Cal.
1994).
127. See, e.g., People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591 (Cal. 1994); State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318
(Minn. 1990). For various surveys of the current status of legal developments protecting the unborn
child in criminal and tort law, see Forsythe, supra note 87, at 595-619; Horan et al., supra note 77,
at 307-09.
128. Paul B. Linton, Planned Parenthood v. Casey: The Flight from Reason in the Supreme
Court, 13 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 15, 47-48 n.141 (1993) (citing 28 states).
129. Hudak v. Georgy, 634 A.2d 600, 602 (Pa. 1993).
130. See, e.g., 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/2.2 (West 1989).
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Today, at least thirty-six jurisdictions allow wrongful death actions for a
stillborn child, while a dwindling minority of eight to ten states reject the
action. '3  Of those allowing wrongful death suits for a stillborn child, the
overwhelming majority allow causes of action for the death of a viable
child,132 while at least ten have rejected a cause of action for the death of pre-
viable child. 3 3 Two jurisdictions allow a cause of action for the death of a
pre-viable child, one by statute and one by judicial decision." Most courts
that decline to extend application before viability do so because of express
deference to the legislature. 35
Tort law's equal treatment of the human being at the time of injury in utero
and after birth shows that the unborn child is treated as a human being at any
stage.s If the child were not a human being until viability, no suit for injury
would exist until after viability; otherwise, either the born child was not injured
or it was injured before it became a person. The rejection of such artificial
distinctions shows that the law recognizes only one entity, who is the same entity
before and after birth.
2. Criminal Law
The criminal law has also progressively developed in its protection of the
unborn. In the twentieth century, where once homicide and abortion law divided
due to evidentiary hurdles, homicide and abortion law have increasingly merged,
with states treating abortion as manslaughter. At the time of Roe, several states
treated as a homicide the killing of an unborn child at some stage of gestation
without regard to live birth.
The born alive rule-created as a bright line evidentiary rule when medicine
was more primitive-became illogical when, through advances in medical
science, the elements of homicide could be reliably demonstrated even if the
child was stillborn. As medical science has developed and the cause of the
131. See generally Sheldon R. Shapiro, Annotation, Right to Maintain Action or to Recover
Damages for Death of Unborn Child, 84 A.L.R.3d 411 (1978 & Supp. 1997).
132. See Linton, supra note 128, at 49-50 n. 147. By statute, Illinois allows suit for prenatal
injuries or wrongful death of stillborn child at any stage of gestation after conception. 740 ILL.
COMp. STAT. 180/2.2 (West 1989).
133. See Coveleski v. Bubnis, 634 A.2d 608, 609-10 (Pa. 1993) (collecting cases).
134. See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/2.2 (West 1989) ("The state of gestation or development
of a human being when an injury is caused, when injury takes effect, or at death, shall not foreclose
maintenance of any cause of action under the law of this State arising from the death of a human
being caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default."); Porter v. Lassiter, 87 S.E.2d 100 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1955).
135. See, e.g., Coveleski, 634 A.2d at 609-10 (denying cause of action for death of pre-viable
child).
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death of the unborn human being has become more easily determinable, the born
alive rule has come under increasing criticism and has been increasingly
rendered meaningless. An increasing number of states have now discarded the
born alive rule at some stage of gestation.
Outside the context of abortion, the number of states protecting the unborn
child through their criminal laws has grown since Roe. Today, more than half
of all states treat the killing of an unborn human being, at some stage of
gestation, as a form of homicide, even though the child is not born alive
(stillborn). Eleven states, including Illinois and Minnesota, define by statute the
killing of an unborn child as a form of homicide, regardless of the stage of
pregnancy. 3 6  One state defines by statute the killing of an unborn human
being after eight to ten weeks gestation as a form of homicide. 31 Eight states
define by statute the killing of an unborn child after quickening as a form of
homicide. 38 Five states define by statute or by caselaw the killing of an
unborn human being after viability as a form of homicide.'39
136. ARIZ. REV. STAT. 13-1103(A)(5) (West 1989 & Supp. 1997); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-
1.2, 5/9-2.1, 5/9-3.2, 5/12-3.1, 5/12-4.4 (West 1994); IND. CODE ANN. 35-42-1-6 (Bums 1994)
(feticide); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:32.5-32.8 (read in conjunction with § 14:2(11) (West 1997));
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.266, 609.2661-609.2665, 609.268(1) (West 1987 & Supp. 1998); MO.
REV. STAT. 1.205, 565.024 (Supp. 1998) (State v. Knapp, 843 S.W.2d 345 (Mo. 1992)); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-17.1-01 to 12.1-17-04 (1995 Supp.); S, 239, 121st Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess.
(Ohio 1996); S. 45, 181st Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-16-1,
22-16-1.1, 22-16-4,22-16-15,22-16-20, 22-16-41, 22-17-6 (Michie 1988) (read in conjunction with
22-1-2(31), 22-1-2(50A) (1996 Supp.)); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-201 (Michie 1995 &Supp. 1997).
Prosecutions under the Illinois law, without regard to time of gestation, are common. See,
e.g., Steven J. Stark, Boyfriend, 21, Is Charged in Pregnant Teen's Slaying, CHI. TRI., Mar. 8,
1998, § 4, at 3 (defendant charged with "intentional homicide of an unborn child").
137. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 1988 & Supp. 1998). See People v. Davis, 872 P.2d
591 (Cal. 1994).
138. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.09 (West 1992 & Supp, 1998); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-80
(Michie 1996); GA. CODE ANN., § 40-6-393.1, 52-7-12.3 (Mich 1997); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 750.322 (West 1991 & Supp. 1997) (limited by judicial decision to viability in Larkin v. Cahalan,
389 Mich. 533, 208 N.W.2d 176 (1973); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-37 (1994); NEV. REV. STAT.
§200.210(1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §713 (West 1983 & Supp. 1998); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 9A.32.060(1)(b) (West 1988 & Supp. 1998); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.04(2)(a) (West 1996
& Supp. 1997).
139. IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.7 (West 1993 & Supp. 1998) (as amended by H.F. 2109 (1996));
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-5 (1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-201 (1997); Commonwealth v.
Lawrence, 536 N.E.2d 571 (Mass. 1989); Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324 (Mass. 1984);
State v. Home, 319 S.E.2d 703 (S.C. 1984).
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In several cases, courts have rejected constitutional challenges to statutes
of this type, including statutes applying throughout gestation." 4  State and
federal courts have recognized that Roe only limits state protection for the
unborn human being when the woman's privacy interest is asserted.
By eliminating the born alive rule in the twentieth century, state homicide
laws have abandoned the arbitrary use of location (outside or inside the womb)
to determine whether a homicide has occurred because location is no longer
relevant to medical determinations of life and death. Thus, the law focuses on
the cause of death at any stage of development. For example, in State v.
Merrill,4' a man killed his estranged girlfriend who was pregnant with a
twenty-eight-day-old embryonic human being, who then died in utero. The
assailant was charged with a double homicide under a state statute that had
abolished the born alive rule, and the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld that
indictment on appeal. Similar cases involving pre-viable unborn human beings
have arisen in Illinois, another state with a similar law that has abolished the
born alive rule without establishing arbitrary gestational limitations. 42 In
California, as a result of the state supreme court's 1994 decision in People v.
Davis,143 a charge of homicide can be brought for the killing of an unborn
human being at any time after eight to ten weeks gestation.'" (It is important
to note that these results could be obtained under the born alive rule, as long as
the pre-viable human being died outside the womb. Obviously, the process of
expulsion itself might result in the death of a fragile, early human being or
prevent live birth, but prematurity itself was irrelevant to the corpus deliciti of
homicide. 145)
140. Smith v. Newsome, 815 F.2d 1386 (Ilth Cir. 1987); People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591 (Cal.
1994); Brinkley v. State, 322 S.E.2d 49 (Ga. 1984); People v. Shum, 512 N.E.2d 1183 (I11. 1987),
cert. denied sub nom. Shurn v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 1079 (1988); People v. Campos, 592 N.E.2d 85
(I11. App. Ct. 1992); People v. Ford, 581 N.E.2d 1189 (III. App. Ct. 1991); State v. Merrill, 450
N.W.2d 318 (Minn. 1990), cert. denied, 496 U.S 931 (1990); State v. Bauer, 471 N.W.2d 363
(Minn. App. 1991); State v. Knapp, 843 S.W.2d 345 (Mo. 1992); State v. Black, 526 N.W.2d 132
(Wis. 1994).
141. 450 N.W.2d 318 (Minn.), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 931 (1990).
142. People v. Shum, 512 N.E.2d 1183 (I11. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Shurn v. Illinois, 484
U.S. 1079 (1988); People v. Campos, 592 N.E.2d 85 (III. App. Ct. 1992); People v. Ford, 581
N.E.2d 1189 (III. App. Ct. 1991).
143. 872 P.2d 591 (Cal. 1994).
144. The court arrived at this result from a strict, biological reading of the legislative term,
"fetus," even though the term "fetus" is commonly used to denote a developing human being at any
stage of development. See, e.g., J.M. TANNER, FOETUS INTO MAN: PHYSICAL GROWTH FROM
CONCEPTION TO MATURITY 38-39 (1978) (where conception and fertilization are properly treated
as equivalent, and "true foetal age" is counted as beginning with fertilization).
145. See Forsythe, supra note 87, at 567-607.
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These developments in homicide law continue in state legislative sessions
in 1998. Recently, Indiana became the twenty-sixth state to treat as a homicide
the killing of an unborn human being at some stage of gestation when it enacted
a law, over the Governor's veto, to treat the killing of a unborn child as a
homicide, whether born alive or not.1" In addition, Michigan and Wisconsin
enacted legislation in 1998 to protect the unborn child ("embryo" and "fetus")
at all stages of gestation. 47 Thus, states continue to extend legal protection
to the unborn human being throughout gestation, and, outside the context of
abortion, a remarkable legal and legislative consensus exists across at least
thirty-eight states that the life of a human being begins at fertilization or
conception. 141
The modern phenomenon of extracorporeal embryos and the focus on their
gestational age thus presents an irony: the killing of a developing human being
outside the womb has always been a homicide without regard to the time of
gestation. Causing the death of human embryos outside the body, even though
created through the fertilization of eggs in vitro, constitutes homicide under basic
homicide law in effect in every state. The fertilization of eggs and death of
embryos in vitro fall outside the scope of the born alive rule (and all of the
common law evidentiary problems that gave rise to the born alive rule). In the
case of natural reproduction and with the traditional application of the born alive
rule, conception occurred inside the womb, and death occurred outside. With
extracorporeal embryos, both conception and death occur outside, thereby
sidestepping the born alive rule and rendering it irrelevant. While prosecutors
will not likely begin to apply homicide laws in this way, such an application of
homicide law would be consistent with the legal tradition protecting
extracorporeal human beings. Because modern legal commentators ignore this
legal tradition, concern for the human embryo is said to be merely
"symbolic."""9 However, far from merely symbolic, such concern is deeply
rooted in Anglo-American jurisprudence going back to the origins of homicide
law.
146. See 1997 Ind. Legis. Serv. P.L. 26-1997 (H.E.A. 1160) (West) (amending IND. CODE §§
35-41-1-25, 35-42-1-0.5, 35-42-1-1, 35-42-1-3, 35-42-1-4, 35-42-2-1.5, 35-50-2-9). Because the
publicized incidents that gave rise to the legislation involved the shooting of a pregnant woman
carrying a presumably viable child, the legislation contained a viability limitation.
147. See S. 21, 89th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 1998); A.B. 221, 93d Reg. Sess. (Wis. 1997)
(enacted June 16, 1998).
148. Linton, supra note 128, at 120 app. B (collecting legislation and caselaw from 38 states).
149. Cf. JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEw
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 252 n.20 (1994) [hereinafter ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE]
("Although not persons or entities which themselves have rights, embryos are potent symbols of
human life and deserve some degree of respect on that basis alone.").
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3. Human Embryos as Persons
The common law-reflected by Blackstone-was quite clear: any human
creature, i.e., any offspring of human parents, is a human being, and every
living human being is a person. The Supreme Court departed from this
longstanding tradition in its decision in Roe v. Wade. In Roe, the Court held
that the human "fetus" was not a "person" and therefore not within the meaning
(and protection) of the Fourteenth Amendment.'50 Roe has now become the
primary reference point for popular and academic discussion concerning the
legal and moral status of unborn human beings and for the proposition that
unborn human beings are not persons. Thus, much of the public debate
regarding abortion and embryo experimentation (including cloning) focuses,
immediately and instinctively, on whether the fetus and embryo are "persons,"
not on whether the fetus and embryo are human beings.'
As a legal matter, identifying an unborn human as a "human being" or a
'person" does not determine whether states can protect the unborn through
homicide law. 152 Under the Constitution, states can protect unborn children,
outside the context of abortion, without regard to their constitutional status as
persons. 113 Thus, states can protect human embryos because neither Roe nor
the embryo's constitutional status limits the states in protecting human embryos
outside the context of abortion.
150. It is important to point out that the Court could not, and did not, determine whether the
unborn child was a human being or person for all purposes of federal or state law.
151. Peter Singer, for example, seems to concede that the unborn human is a human being,
while denying that it is a person.
When opponents of abortion say that the embryo is a living human being from
conception onwards, all they can possibly mean is that the embryo is a living member
of the species Homo sapiens. That is all that can be established as a scientific fact. But
is this also the sense in which every "human being" has a right to life? We think not.
To claim that every human being has a right to life solely because it is biologically a
member of the species Homo sapiens is to make species membership the basis of rights.
Helga Kuhse & Peter Singer, The Moral Status of the Embryo, in TEST-TUBE BABIES 60 (William
Walters & Peter Singer eds., 1984).
This does not mean that all moral philosophers or legal commentators concede that the unborn
human is a human being at every stage of development after fertilization. See, e.g., Stephen C.
Hicks, Law, Policy and Personhood in the Context of the Techniques of Human Experimentation in
Modem Medicine, 19 CAP. U. L. REV. 255, 298 (1990) ("The simple fact is that the embryo and
the pre-viable fetus are not persons, individuals or human beings, albeit human life, no matter how
romantic we may be about the human species.").
152. See People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591 (Cal. 1994); People v. Campos, 592 N.E.2d 85 (I11.
App. Ct. 1992); State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318 (Minn. 1990).
153. Roe has been held to be limited to abortion, and, outside the context of abortion, the states
can protect the unborn human being at every stage of development. See supra note 141 and
accompanying text.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 32, No. 2 [1998], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol32/iss2/6
1998] HUMAN CLONING AND THE CONSTITUTION 503
However, as a policy matter, the same rational attributes in the developing
human being that are scrutinized to deny personhood to the unborn human as a
matter of moral philosophy are used to deny them any legal protection. But,
just as state law may reasonably protect the unborn human at every stage of
development because the unborn is a human being, state law may also
reasonably consider-based on legal history, contemporary law, and medical
science-the unborn human, at every stage of development, a person as well,
and to protect it as such.
One standard American dictionary defines "person" as "a human
being."154 This has also been the case in many areas of law, traditionally."'5
"Person" may mean more than that, but it means at least that.156  For
constitutional purposes, state laws, legislation, and court decisions are more
relevant to determining the scope of substantive due process than are the
unenacted opinions or policies of medical organizations, trade associations, or
contemporary moral philosophers or theologians. As the Supreme Court noted
in Washington v. Glucksberg, "[tihe primary and most reliable indication of a
national consensus is . . .the pattern of enacted laws."' 57
In opposition to legal and normative tradition, many alternative moral
theories about the status of the human fetus have been proferred over the past
three decades. While these few decades of moral and legal thought represent
a very short period of time when compared to the many centuries during which
154. See, e.g., AMERICAN HERITAGE STUDENT DICTIONARY 720 (1994) ("a living human
being; an individual"); RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1445 (2d ed.
1987); WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1338 (Deluxe Second ed. 1979);
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 876 (1987) ("Human Being, Individual");
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1686 (1993).
155. See, e.g., Telefilm, Inc. v. Superior Court, 194 P.2d 542, 547, 551 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948)
("After death one is no longer a 'person'; he ceases to be a human being and becomes a corpse,
'death' being the cessation of all vital functions without capability of resuscitation."); People v.
Gould, 179 N.E. 848, 850 (Il1. 1932) ("Word 'person,' as used in Forgery Statute, means a human
being."); People v. Guzzardo, 124 N.E.2d 39, 41 (111. App. Ct. 1955) ("'Person' is a generic word
of comprehensive nature, which includes human beings and is not a technical term or word of art
.... "); Dufour v. Westlawn Cemetaries Inc., 639 So. 2d 843, 847 (La. Ct. App. 1994) ("'Person'
within meaning of Louisiana Civil Code is living human being and does not include one who has
died."); Commonwealth v. Welosky, 177 N.E. 656, 659 (Mass. 1931) ("The natural and obvious
meaning of the word 'person' is a living human being."); Madden v. Board of Election, 146 N.E.
280, 281 (Mass. 1925) ("'persons,' within statute, meaning living human beings"); Bale v. Ryder,
290 A.2d 359, 360 (Me. 1972) ("'Person' is defined as a human being."); In re Searight's Estate,
5 N.E.2d 779 784 (Ohio Ct. App. 1950) ("A 'person' is a human being").
156. See, e.g., State v. Logsdon, 248 N.W. 4, 6-7 (Iowa 1933) ("The term 'any person' is
very broad, and includes anybody. Any being having life, intelligence, will and separate individual
existence; ...a human being, an individual of the human race, a living human being; a living
person composed of body and soul. .. ").
157. 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2263 (1997) (quoting Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 373 (1989)).
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the Anglo-American legal tradition considered any human creature-that is, any
offspring of human parents-to be a human being, the influence of these more
recent theories on modem law has been profound, even overshadowing the
longstanding Anglo-American legal tradition.158 For example, Justice Stevens,
concurring in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists,'59 voiced the sentiment that the legal protection afforded to the
embryo depends on its stage of development after fertilization. He stated that
it is "obvious that the State's interest in the protection of an embryo increases
progressively and dramatically as the organism's capacity to feel pain, to
experience pleasure, to survive, and to react to its surroundings increases day
by day."160
Thus, in contemporary moral philosophy and modem case law, a shift has
occurred concerning "personhood"; rather than considering the unborn human
being a member of the human species based on its essential biological nature,
the current trend is to consider the expression of subjective attributes. It is often
conceded-even among those who deny that the fetus is a "person"-that, with
fertilization, a "genetically unique, living human entity" is formed.' 16  Instead
158. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992); Kass v. Kass, No. 53, 1998
N.Y. LEXIS 1022, at *1 (N.Y..May 7, 1998).
159. 476 U.S. 747, 778 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).
160. Id. at 778 (Stevens, J., concurring). See also Richard G. Frey, The Ethics of the Search
for Benefits: Animal Experimentation in Medicine, in PRINCIPLES OF HEALTH CARE ETHICS 1067-75
(Raanan Gillon ed., 1994). Yet, as one scholar has justly noted, if Justice Stevens' notion was
correct,
the State's interest in protecting the newborn as well as the mentally incompetent and
disabled would be less than its interest in protecting competent adults who are arguably
better capable of interacting with society, experiencing pleasure and reacting to their
surroundings. Such a -notion is clearly contrary to existing laws and principles of
equality under the law.
Linton, supra note 128, at 39 n.107.
161. See, e.g., Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society, Ethical Considerations of
the New Reproductive Technologies, 53 FERTILITY & STERILITY IS, 7S, 35S (Supp. 2 1990);
McCormick, supra note 24, at 15; Teresa Iglesias, In Vitro Fertilization: The Major Issues, 10 J.
MED. ETHICS 36 (1984) ("We know that a new human individual organism with the internal
potential to develop into an adult, given nurture, comes into existence as a result of the process of
fertilization at conception"). As John Robertson, for example, has written, "While the
preimplantation embryo is clearly human and alive, it does not follow that it is also a 'human life'
or 'human being' in the crucial sense of a person with rights or interests." John A. Robertson,
Resolving Disputes over Frozen Embryos, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Nov. -Dec. 1989, at 11. Or, as
Bonnie Steinbock has written, "embryos are not mere things. They are alive and they are human."
Bonnie Steinbock, The Moral Status of Extracorporeal Embryos: Pre-born Children, Property or
Something Else, in ETHICS AND BIOTECHNOLOGY 82 (Anthony Dyson & John Harris eds., 1994).
She sees herself as developing "a theory of moral status that I call 'the interest' view based on Joel
Feinberg's 'interest principle.'" Id. at 91 n.2.
This is not universal, however, and even the human status of the fetus is still denied
sometimes. See, e.g., Jennifer Nedelsky, Property in Potential Life? A Relational Approach to
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of genetic individuality, however, IVF practitioners and advocates emphasize
"developmental individuality.' Clifford Grobstein, for example, emphasizes
six elements of individuality: "genetic, developmental, functional, behavioral,
psychic, and social.""
For those with a developmental perspective of personhood, the beginning
of personhood may be marked by many different events, attributes, or "morally
significant qualities" after fertilization. These include implantation, the
development of the embryonic disk or primitive streak (about fourteen days after
fertilization and apparently the last stage at which twins may form),"
sentience (the capacity for sensation or feeling), the occurrence of brain waves
or "brain birth,"" viability," consciousness, birth, or even some time
Choosing Legal Categories, 6 CAN. 1. L & JURIs. 343, 343 n.2 (1993) ("I shall consistently refer
to 'stages of potential life'.. .. I should note that 'stages of potential life' is actually a short-hand
form of the more appropriate phrase, 'stages of potential human life.' These various stages are in
fact alive, they are just not yet human.").
162. This reliance on developmental attributes is a key piece of Clifford Grobstein's argument,
whose writings on human development, in turn, have heavily influenced Professor John A.
Robertson, author of many works on VF and embryo experimentation and manipulation. See
generally CLIFFORD GROBSTEIN, FROM CHANCE TO PURPOSE (1981); CLIFFORD GROBSTEIN,
SCIENCE AND THE UNBORN: CHOOSING HUMAN FuTUREs (1988) [hereinafter GROBSTEIN,
SCIENCE]; Clifford Grobstein, The Early Development of Human Embryos, I0 J. MED. & PHIL. 213
(1985) [hereinafter Grobstein, Early Development]; Clifford Grobstein et al., External Human
Fertilization: An Evaluation of Policy, 222 SCI. 127 (1983); Clifford Grobstein, The Moral Uses
of "Spare" Embryos, HASTINGS CTR. REP., June 1982, at 5. Robertson's legal theories are almost
entirely derived from Grobstein's account of human development. See, e.g., Robertson, Embryos,
supra note 70, at968-69 nn.85-94 (citing Grobstein, Early Development, supra); John A. Robertson,
Decisional Authority over Embryos and Control of IVF Technology, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 285, 294
n.26 (1988) [hereinafter Robertson, Decisional Authority] (citing Grobstein, Early Development,
supra, at 213, 214). According to John Robertson, the preimplantation embryo "has not yet
developed the biological structures of personhood and is not yet developmentally individual."
Robertson, Embryos, supra note 70, at 972.
163. GROBSTEIN, SCIENCE, supra note 162, at 22. See also id. at 21-57.
164. See, e.g., NORMAN M. FORD, WHEN DID I BEGIN? 170-71, 181 (1988); Robertson,
Embryos, supra note 70, at 969-70; Steinbock, supra note 161, at 82-83.
165. See, e.g., Gary B. Gertler, Brain Birth: A Proposal for Defining When a Fetus Is Entitled
to Human Life Status, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1061 (1986).
166. See, e.g., Agota Peterfy, Fetal Viability as a Threshold to Personhood, 16 J. LEGAL MED.
607 (1995).
167. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION 23 (1994) (a human embryo does not
have rights because not conscious). See also Stephen C. Hicks, Law, Policy and Personhood in the
Context of the Techniques of Hunan Experimentation in Modem Medicine, 19 CAP. U. L. REv. 255,
299 (1990) ("Only with consciousness can a person be said to exist."); Michael Lockwood, Warnock
Versus Powell (and Harradine): When Does Potentiality Count?, 2 BIOETHIcS 187-213 (1988);
Michael Lockwood, When Does Life Begin?, in MORAL DILEMMAS IN MODERN MEDICINE (Michael
Lockwood ed., 1985).
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after birth."6 When faced with such a smorgasbord of developmental criteria,
the 1994 National Institute of Health (NIH) Human Embryo Research Panel
dismissed all as "single criterion views" and adopted a "pluralistic approach,"
which emphasizes "a being's increasing possession of qualities that make
respecting it . . . more compelling." 69 But this is a distinction without a
difference.
For example, a key "marker" purportedly occurs with the appearance of
the embryonic disk (or embryonic axis or primitive streak) at approximately
fourteen days after fertilization. Apparently, this event is important because it
"roughly corresponds to the time of implantation and to the initiation of
physiological changes of pregnancy in the mother. Prior to this point, the pre-
embryo is not individual since twinning... could still occur."" 7 The embryo
is more developed after implantation than before-there is "no possibility of
feeling or experience" before the "embryonic disk, axis, and primitive streak"
appear.' Much emphasis is placed on the distinction between the inner cell
mass and outer cell mass of the early embryo."7 It is argued that the embryo
deserves no respect before the appearance of the embryonic disk because the
outer cell mass will become placenta while the inner cell mass will become the
"embryo proper."
How this is morally relevant is not apparent. Regardless, a human
organism is present. Moreover, whether, with further development and
differentiation, some cells provide nourishment, while some form the placenta,
and still others form the embryonic disk, they are inextricably intertwined.
Although current levels of scientific knowledge may not be sufficient to draw
clear lines of distinction, the single, genetically-unique, human entity is still
present throughout this entire developmental process.
This notion of "developmental individuality" is arguably advanced by the
use of a new term, "pre-embryo." Various trade and other organizations and
advocates who support fetal experimentation now use the term to help justify
168. See DWORKIN, supra note 167, at 84. Cf. Gerard Bradley, Life's Dominion: A Review
Essay, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 329 (1993); Richard Stith, On Death and Dworkin: A Critique
of His Theory of Inviolability, 56 MD. L. REV. 289 (1997).
169. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HEALTH, FINAL REPORT OF THE HUMAN EMBRYO RESEARCH
PANEL 49 (1994).
170. John A. Robertson, Embryos, supra note 70, at 970 (quoting American Fertility Society,
Ethical Considerations in the Use of New Reproductive Technologies, 46 FERTILITY & STERILITY
(Spec. Supp. 1986)).
171. Id. Robertson, for example, looks for "precursors of embryonic and fetal nervous
structures." Id. at 970.
172. See, e.g., C.R. AUSTIN, HUMAN EMBRYOS: THE DEBATE ON ASSISTED REPRODUCTION
12-13 (1989).
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embryo experimentation," 7' and their moral and policy conclusions regarding
experimentation flow directly from this label, "pre-embryo." Their premise is
that "singleness is not established until an embryonic axis is formed, an event
which roughly corresponds to the time of implantation . . . .""a The
Tennessee Supreme Court adopted the term in Davis v. Davis,7 n being heavily
influenced by the American Fertility Society, now called the American Society
for Reproductive Medicine, which represents fertility clinics.
The term "pre-embryo" is artificial and was unknown to medical literature
before 1979 when the NIH Ethics Advisory Board used the term. The term is
not based on any new scientific discoveries or data and has never been proposed
for any other species than human. It is noteworthy that human embryologists
do not use the term and have in fact criticized it as inaccurate. 76 For
instance, Lee Silver, professor and microbiologist at Princeton University and
author of a recent book defending the prospect of human cloning, aptly
summarized the political motivations that underlie the use of the term "pre-
embryo":
The term pre-embryo has been embraced wholeheartedly by IVF
practitioners for reasons that are political, not scientific. The new
term is used to provide the illusion that there is something profoundly
different between what we nonmedical biologists still call a six-day-old
embryo and what we and everyone else call a sixteen-day-old embryo.
The term pre-embryo is useful in the political arena-where
decisions are made about whether to allow early embryo (now called
pre-embryo) experimentation-as well as in the confines of a doctor's
office, where it can be used to allay moral concerns that might be
expressed by IVF patients. "Don't worry," a doctor might say, "it's
only pre-embryos that we're manipulating or freezing. They won't
turn into real human embryos until after we've put them back into
your body."
173. See generally Dianne N. Irving, Philosophical and Scientific Analysis of the Nature of the
Early Human Embryo (1991) (unpublished D. Phil. Dissertation, Georgetown University) (on file
with author).
174. Robertson, Embryos, supra note 70, at 970. In contrast, Richard McCormick would
define "pre-embryo" as an "embryo whose cells have not yet differentiated into placenta and fetus."
McCormick, supra note 24, at 14-15. So, the "pre-embryo" is an embryo. See also Karen
Dawson, Introduction: An Outline of Scientific Aspects of Human Embryo Research, in EMBRYO
EXPERIMENTATION 4 (Peter Singer et al. ed., 1990) (equating pre-implantation embryo with "pre-
embryo" as identifying this as "the entity which exists during the first 14 days of development after
fertilization").
175. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
176. O'RAHiLLY & MULLER, supra note 37, at 55.
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Biologically speaking, an important developmental event does
occur at fourteen days. But there are other important developmental
events that occur before that time and many more that occur later.'"
Biochemicist Erwin Chargaff had a similar critique of the result-oriented
label:
The "pre-embryo" is a designation that appears to me entirely
unjustified. I fear that it is merely an alibi function . . .. The
attempt to determine, by scientific means, the stage at which what for
times immemorial had been called the human soul makes it
appearance, is ridiculous. The setting of a calendar date serves only
as a permit for the performance of experiments that normal reverence
before human life would have outlawed .... 178
The 1984 Report of the British Committee (the Warnock Committee), the first
governmental body to review IVF policy, noted the continuity of the
development process: "There is no particular part of the developmental process
that is more important than another; all are part of a continuous process, and
unless each stage takes place normally, at the correct time, and in the correct
sequences, further development will cease." 79
Four compelling flaws undermine the use of "developmental individuality"
to determine "personhood." First, emphasizing expression and appearance over
essential nature and capacity is superficial. The essential nature of the human
being is more significant than the exercise of powers which follow from that
nature. This tends to fall into the "danger of identifying or locating the self
within the brain."" Human nature is not identical with any of these activities
or powers; in fact, human nature remains even when these activities are not
undertaken or these powers are not excercised. Activities and powers are only
attributes of human nature. An organism is not less of a being (an integral
whole with actual existence) because it is immature or because it cannot perform
functions that mature members can perform. Denying that a human being is a
person because some of its attributes are not yet expressed is tantamount to
saying that a human being is not a person because it is not mature. It is ironic
177. SILVER, supra note 2, at 39.
178. Erwin Chargaff, Engineering a Molecular Nightmare, 327 NATURE 199, 200 (1987).
179. See SILVER, supra note 2, at 40 (quoting WARNOCK COMMITTEE REPORT IN GREAT
BRITAIN, UNITED KINGDOM, DEPT. OF HEALTH & SOCIAL SECURITY, REPORT OF THE COMMrTTEE
OF INQUIRY INTO HUMAN FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY (1984)).
180. O'RAHILLY & MULLER, supra note 33, at 8 (quoting Mario Moussa and Thomas A.
Shannon, The Search for the New Pineal Gland: Brain Life and Personhood, HASTINGS CTR. REP.,
May-June 1992, at 30).
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that advocates of the developmental individuality perspective emphasize an
unborn human being's lack of attributes during the very time when the human
being is going through its greatest and most rapid period of development. We
know that something deeper than what appears on the surface defines the nature
of the embryo and will determine its future perfection.
Second, advocates of developmental individuality highlight partial
characteristics and fail to examine the whole being. Biological markers after
conception (fertilization) are inevitably based on only a few or partial
characteristics of the developing entity, not on its intrinsic nature or integral
wholeness, and are thus arbitrary. The nature of the developing human being
(the whole genetic constitution, including the gender) is established at
fertilization; subsequent growth continues throughout gestation and beyond.
Indeed, as developmental biologists suggest, "morphogenesis f continues right
up to adulthood and, indeed, in some parts of the body, into old age."'' The
notion of developmental individuality does not rely on any new modem scientific
knowledge that shows the human embryo to be less than human, but rather it
slices and dices the biological facts to create arbitrary lines. It is an application
of the old adage, "familiarity breeds contempt."
For example, the possibility of twinning within the first two to two-and-a-
half weeks of embryonic development is sometimes said to indicate that the
embryo is "non-individuated" and has yet to acquire "determinate individuality,
a stable (ontological) human identity. "1 However, it is not logically sound
to formulate general principles on the rare case of twinning. At least two
problems attend the not-an-individual-until-after-twinning argument. First, it
supplants a rare exceptional occurrence for the rule. Second, it deflects
attention from the unique entity that does exist, which has genetic individuality
at all points, and which may become two, but it will not become less than one.
While a single embryo may twin, though it may die, it will not become less than
a twin (with rare exceptions). Whether a singleton or twins, the developing
embryo deserves protection because of its human nature. The possibility for
rare exceptions does not determine proper treatment for the living embryo that
is developing.
Similarly, it is not logically sound to formulate general principles on the
possibility that the developing embryo may die from various natural causes or
cease to develop (emphasizing that many embryos "fail to implant" or are
"spontaneously aborted" due to natural causes). With born human beings, the
law does not discount responsibility for induced causes of death simply because
181. TANNER, supra note 144, at 39.
182. O'RAHILLY & MULLER, supra note 33, at 8.
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many human beings die from natural causes. There is no reason to do this
before birth either, although biologists sometimes tend to disregard the
distinction between natural and unnatural causes. And yet, even in such cases,
we are inclined to refer to them as children socially.8 3 The very purpose of
homicide law is to give significance to unnatural causes and to determine those
causes and assess responsibility. Because the law gives great emphasis to the
distinction after birth, it has reasonably done so before birth, as the born alive
rule attests.
A related argument that disputes the proposition that a human embryo is a
person is the argument that the fetus or embryo is only a "potential person. " "
This argument often confuses the potential with the possible and reveals an
underlying ontological dualism, a notion that there is a mind-body split in the
human being. Potential also confuses nature-capacity with relative maturity. It
is not enough, under this rationale, that a capacity is possessed, it must also be
actively exercised or exhibited. These abstractions miss the practical way in
which we think about human potential. It can be captured in the notion that a
young man or woman may "achieve their potential." Maturity, or fetal
development, is simply the actualizing of potentiality. We commonly recognize
developmental stages after birth-infancy, childhood, adolescence, adulthood,
and etc.-as common stages of the maturing process without denying that a
person exists throughout that process and that an immature person is still a
person.
Third, the concept of developmental individuality has no consistent or
logical stopping point. The distinctions based on rational attributes and the
expression of innate capacities logically extend beyond birth itself, and some
philosophers frankly acknowledge this and would defend infanticide as well. An
infant, throughout the first several months after birth, cannot speak and can utter
few sounds beyond crying. Its only means of communication is crying. It may
smile within the first month or two, but it is unclear whether this reflects
pleasure or simply mimicking the smile of another person. The newborn does
not know its name and will not respond to its name. The newborn does not
readily focus its gaze or keep eye contact with another person. It will not speak
183. See, e.g., TANNER, supra note 144, at 38. "In as many as 1% to 2% of all conceptions
a fertilized ovum is made with a single x chromosome only, without either a Y or a second X. The
karyotype is written XO. The very great majority of such children die in utero, often so early in
pregnancy that the mother does not even know she has aborted an embryo." Id. at 55 (emphasis
added).
184. See, e.g., Stephen Buckle, Arguing from Potential, in EMBRYO EXPERIMENTATION (Peter
Singer et al. eds., 1990); Peter Singer & Karen Dawson, IVF Technology and the Argument from
Potential, in EMBRYO EXPERIMENTATION (Peter Singer et al. eds., 1990); John Harris, Embryos and
Hedgehogs: On the Moral Status of the Embryo, in EXPERIMENTS ON EMBRYOS 65-81 (Anthony
Dyson & John Harris eds., 1990).
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(at least not coherently) until nearly two years after birth. Other developmental
attributes that are delayed beyond infancy could also be mentioned. Is the infant
really "conscious" before the child can have its first memory of life?
These marker events inevitably result in breaches of the line drawn by birth
itself, resulting in the sanctioning of infanticide, as seen in the writings of
Englehardt,'5 Tooley, " Singer, 187 Kuhse, 18 8 Dworkin, 89  Frey, "
and Pinker.'9' The same arguments that various philosophers employ to deny
protection to the embryo or fetus would justify infanticide as well. Indeed, even
the language is changed (e.g., neonaticide) to blur birth as a dividing line.
Thus, Stephen Pinker, Professor of Psychology at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology and author of a recent book, How the Mind Works, has recently
185. H. TRIsTAM ENGLEHARDT, THE FOUNDATIONS OF BIoETHics 104-13 (1986).
186. See, e.g., Michael Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide, in THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF
ABORTION (Marshall Cohen et al. ed.,1974) ("an organism possesses a ... right to life only if it
possesses the concept of a self"); Michael Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide, 2 PHIL & PUB. AFF.
37 (1972).
187. See, e.g., PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS 122-23 (1979):
I have argued that the life of a fetus is of no greater value than the life of a non-human
animal at a similar level of rationality, self-consciousness, awareness, capacity to feel,
etc., and that since no fetus is a person no fetus has the same claim to life as a person.
Now it must be admitted that these arguments apply to the newborn baby as much as
to the fetus. A week-old baby is not a rational and self-conscious being, and there are
many nonhuman animals whose rationality, self-consciousness, awareness, capacity to
feel, and so on, exceed that of a human baby a week, a month, or even a year old. If
the fetus does not have the same claim to life as a person, it appears that the newborn
baby does not either, and the life of a newborn baby is of less value than the life of a
pig, a dog, or a chimpanzee.
Id.
188. HELGA KUHSE & PETER SINGER, SHOULD THE BABY LIVE? THE PROBLEM OF
HANDICAPPED INFANTS 138 (1985).
189. DWORKIN, supra note 167.
190. See generally Frey, supra note 160.
191. See, e.g., STEVEN PINKER, HOW THE MIND WORKS (1998); Steven Pinker, Why They Kill
Their Newborns, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1997, (Magazine), at 52, 54.
What makes a living being a person with a right not to be killed? ... Perhaps only the
members of our own species, Homo sapiens, have a right to life? But that is simply
chauvinism; a person of one race could just as easily say that people of another race
have no right to life. No, the right to life must come, the moral philosophers say, from
morally significant traits that we humans happen to possess. One such trait is having
a unique sequence of experiences that defines us as individuals and connects us to other
people. Other traits include an ability to reflect upon ourselves as a continuous locus
of consciousness, to form and savor plans for the future, to dread death and to express
the choice not to die. And there's the rub: our immature neonates don't possess these
traits any more than mice do.
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suggested that birth as a line of protection for human beings be reexamined."
These elevated tests apply just as well to infants and older children. If we reject
their application to newborns because we recognize that immaturity does not
detract from moral status, we should question their application to unborn human
beings as well. More human development occurs between conception and birth
than between birth and puberty.
Defining personhood by various attributes, rather than by membership in
the human species, has serious problems. We begin to attach significance to
select attributes and differentiate people based on the presence of these attributes
or rational behavior. Under this approach, personhood is human status plus
attributes. As we define people by attributes before birth, we place higher
priority on those attributes after birth and rate superiority or inferiority on the
expression of these select attributes. Social and then legal treatment will be
based on these attributes. '3 As Roscoe Pound illustrates, this is not liberal;
rather, it is illiberal and a throwback to pre-modem notions of legal
personality. 114
Fourth, the developmental individuality perspective does not reflect
practical reality. The reality of IVF technology itself undercuts this perspective.
IVF technicians do not implant only embryos with select developmental
attributes, on some theory that only then is it known that they are human.
Instead, IVF technicians implant human embryos who are fertilized in vitro at
the earliest stages-"usually at the 2-8 cell stage. " " (In an in utero
pregnancy, by comparison, the embryo at the 2-8 cell stage is still passing
through the Fallopian tube and has yet to enter the uterus for implantation.) The
IVF technicians transfer the embryo to the uterus at this stage knowing that the
developmental capacity is there, that the embryo has the inherent capacity to
develop and mature, and that this capacity will be expressed in time. They
cannot, and do not need to, wait for the embryo to mature or to express certain
characteristics before the embryo is transferred."9
Across all its developmental stages, the human being, as one-celled zygote,
embryo, fetus, newborn, adolescent, and adult human being, has genetic
uniqueness and developmental continuity. The insight of John Beck, a leading
192. Pinker, supra note 191, at 52, 54 ("The leniency shown to neonaticidal mothers forces us
to think the unthinkable and ask if we, like many societies and like the mothers themselves, are not
completely sure whether a neonate is a full person.") Id.
193. See, e.g., Martha A. Fields, Killing "The Handicapped"-Before and After Birth, 16
HARv. WOMEN's L.J. 79 (1993).
194. 1 POUND, supra note 108, at 411.
195. Dawson, supra note 174, at 4 ("It is usually at the 2-8 cell stage that the in vitro pre-
embryo is transferred to the uterus of a woman for further development.").
196. Id. at 6. The longest that an in vitro embryo can survive is 13 days.
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nineteenth century legal authority, is as relevant today as it was then: "The
foetus is certainly, if we speak physiologically, as much a living being
immediately after conception, as at any other time before delivery; and its future
progress is but the development and increase of those constituent principles
which it then received." "7 Modem science provides reasonable confirmation
of the common law position, reflected in Blackstone, that any human
creature-that is, the offspring of human parents-is a human being and that
every living human being is a person. As the Scottish philosopher, Thomas
Torrance has pointed out, "[i]f ... we want to think of the human embryo as
'potentially person,' that must be taken to mean, not that the embryo is in the
process of becoming something else, but rather that the embryo continues to
become what he or she already is . . . .""
V. HUMAN CLONING, "PROCREATIVE LIBERTY,"
AND THE LIMITS OF ROE V. WADE
Whether human cloning is a constitutional right involves an application of,
as one renowned scholar has phrased it, "the most fundamental question of
modem constitutional theory: when, and under what conditions, may courts
invalidate duly enacted state or federal laws on the basis of unenumerated
constitutional rights?" 1' 9 The Supreme Court's 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade
has spawned twenty-five years of litigation, legislation, scholarship, cultural
change, and public discussion concerning the scope of a constitutional right to
sexual reproduction. Proponents of an expansive right to sexual reproduction
have given it various names and descriptions, among them "procreative liberty,"
'a right of the couple to reproduce," and "a right to form a family." John
Robertson, one of the leading advocates of a broad "procreative liberty,"
contends that "reproductive freedom" has traditionally been a right taken for
granted." Of course, this begs a definition of "reproductive freedom."
Charles Kindregan was undoubtedly more accurate in stating that "the
responsibility for the transmission of life has by tradition, necessity, and law
been entrusted to the private discretion of the family."2"1 But a unique and
197. 1 JOHN BECK, ELEMENTS OF MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 276 (11 th ed. 1860).
198. THOMAS F. TORRANCE, TEST-TUBE BABIES (1984), quoted in NIGEL M. DES. CAMERON,
EMBRYOS AND ETHICS: THE WARNOCK REPORT IN DEBATE 9 (1987).
199. Amicus Brief for Senator Orrin Hatch et al. at 1, Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997)
(No. 95-1858), 1996 WL 657755. See also Michael W. McConnell, The Right to Die and the
Jurisprudence of Tradition, 1997 UTAH L. REv. 665 (1997).
200. See ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE, supra note 149, at 22-42.
201. Charles P. Kindregan, State Power Over Human Fertility and Individual Liberty, 23
HASTINGS L.J. 1401, 1402 (1972). From his citation of Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495 (1965), it is clear that Kindregan understood "family"
to mean the marital relations between a husband and wife. See also Daniel Callahan, Cloning: Then
and Now, 7 CAMBRIDGE J. OF HEALTHCARE ETHICS 141, 142 (1998) ("The right to procreate, as
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unprecedented extension of substantive due process would be necessary to create
a right to use technology for asexual reproduction such as cloning.
A. Substantive Due Process
The Supreme Court's substantive due process decisions of the twentieth
century do not support a broad right to "procreative liberty" that encompasses
using technology for asexual reproduction or for cloning more particularly.
Prince v. Massachusetts'u and Moore v. City of East Cleveland2°3 involved
traditional family relationships. Two other cases related to parenting rights are
deeply based in the common law: Meyer v. Nebraska'°4 dealt with the
education of children, and Pierce v. Society of Sisters' s concerned the decision
of parents to send their child to a private school. Skinner v. Oklahoma' 6
dealt with liberty against government-ordered, coerced sterilization, a negative
liberty that could be based in deeply-rooted, common law notions of battery and
informed consent. Justice Harlan's opinion in Poe v. Ullman was limited to the
marital use of contraception, which had been criminalized by a state statute.
Indeed, he considered what the states had done with the marital use of
contraception and found that the "utter novelty of this [state's] enactment" was
"conclusive."2"7 Loving v. Virginia'ta involved the freedom to marry, a
union deeply rooted in Anglo-American law, and racial discrimination contrary
to the text of the Fourteenth Amendment. Eisenstadt v. Baird" involved the
use of contraceptives by individuals, not married couples.2"' In summarizing
this line of cases, it may be said that Skinner is to cloning as Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Department of Health2 ' is to assisted suicide: both Skinner and
Cruzan involved negative liberties that relate to the refusal of treatment based
on concepts of battery and informed consent; they did not involve positive
liberties to an activity or power. To use Charles Kindregan's description of the
a claimed human right, is primarily of post-World War II vintage.").
202. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
203. 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
204. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
205. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
206. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
207. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 554 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See also Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
208. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
209. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
210. Id. at 453 ("If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married
or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamental ... as
the decision whether to bear or beget a child.") (emphasis added)
211. 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (holding that a state may require clear and convincing proof of a
patient's desire to withhold medical treatment, that a competent person has a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment, and that a state has a legitimate
interest in the protection and preservation of human life).
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scope of the constitutional rights, these cases deal with either "the traditional
privacy of the nuclear family" or "the right to control one's body."212 In
American law, procreation is inextricably intertwined with the marital
relationship between husband and wife. "Procreative freedom" is too broad a
description of what the Supreme Court has actually held to be constitutionally
protected from popular, democratically-approved limitations or regulations.
Because no general right to medical treatment exists,213 the strength of any
possible "right" to human cloning is diminished, especially when one considers
the fact that cloning does not alleviate infertility, but rather circumvents it, and
that cloning is not therapeutic.
To put it another way, substantive due process cases in the area of family
law and reproduction that preceded Roe are limited and distinguishable in a
number of ways. 4  First and foremost, with the exception perhaps of
Eisenstadt v. Baird, the rights recognized have historical antecedents that are
deeply rooted in American law and were explicitly recognized as such.2"'
While American law may establish a privacy interest in marital coital
reproduction, even this is limited to marriage, and the precedents leading to Roe
fairly establish this. Harlan's specific emphasis in Poe v. Ullman was that the
state statute in question criminalized marital use of contraception.2 16  While
a right to the use of contraceptives, even by minors, may exist, there is still no
established liberty in premarital or extramarital sexual relations." 7
212. See Kindregan, supra note 201, at 1403.
213. United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979).
214. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965);
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
215. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) ("Mhe Constitution protects
the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition."); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) ("the
liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their
control," "engaged in a kind of undertaking ... long regarded as useful and meritorious"); Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (summarizing the Fourteenth Amendment as encompassing
an individual's right "to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men").
216. 367 U.S. 497, 554-55 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting from dismissal on jurisdictional
grounds). See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring in
the judgment).
217. Indeed, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court implicitly acknowledged the state's authority to
prohibit "extramarital and premarital sexual relations. . . ." 405 U.S. 438, 448 (1972). And
Eisenstadt was based on the Equal Protection Clause, not the Due Process Clause. Likewise, Carey
v. Population Services International, decided after Roe, did not create a right to premarital or
extramarital sexual activity. Carey, 431 U.S. 678, 688 n.5, 694, 694 n.17 (1977). See id. at 688
(summarizing previous decisions by the Court as guaranteeing "an individual's right to decide to
prevent conception or terminate pregnancy"); see also id. at 702 (White, J., concurring in part and
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Quite clearly, a constitutional right to cloning cannot be logically derived
from the two sets of substantive due process cases that Professor Robertson
posits as a basis for non-coital reproduction. 18 The first line of cases involves
contraception and abortion, both of which involve a person's physical integrity
and a right to avoid procreation- a right not to procreate, as Robertson points
out. From this, Robertson derives a positive right to procreate by non-coital
techniques but without any reasoning: "This well-established right [not to
procreate] implies the freedom not to exercise it and, hence, the freedom to
procreate." 2"9 The right to use contraception, as developed by American
courts, may well assume a right not to use contraception, but this assumption
involves only coital reproduction, nothing more.
The second line of cases involves rearing children or the "assignment of
rearing rights," in Robertson's words, from which he infers "a right to bring
children into the world."' Parental rights are deeply rooted in the common
law. However, the several limitations on these rights suggest that they do not
logically encompass any right to non-coital reproduction. First, the parental
relationship is founded in duty, not ownership. It is apparent in Robertson's
construction of his procreative liberty that the essence of his parental right is the
exertion of parental will, a notion of ownership, the imposition of personal
desire, and a conditional love or care. Indeed, these very notions characterized
the complete autonomy of the Roman fathers over their children, but this
authoritarian character was specifically repudiated by the common law.22" '
Second, these rights assume the existence of children issuing from coital
reproduction in the marital relationship, and nothing more. Third, parental
rights are limited by the interests of the children. While Roe created a liberty
to end the life of a child conceived in utero but not yet born, it says nothing
about ending the life of children conceived in vitro. Roe involves a right to be
free of the physical burden of pregnancy. m Hence, nothing in Supreme Court
caselaw jumps the logical and physical gap between reproduction that physically
burdens the woman and reproduction that does not, and scholars, legal
commentator, and others cannot properly rely on the Supreme Court cases
involving rights related to coital reproduction, which are based on physical
integrity, to defend the cases involving coital reproduction through the
extracorporeal use of somatic cells to clone.
concurring in the judgment); id. at 713 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
218. Robertson, Procreative Liberty, supra note 70, at 415.
219. Id. at 416.
220. Id.
221. See infra notes 327-31 and accompanying text.
222. See infra part V.B.
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Richard McCormick has lodged an insightful critique against Professor
Robertson's utilitarian approach to the moral and constitutional issues
surrounding the status of the human embryo and human cloning by blastomere
separation (despite McCormick's use of the term "pre-embryo" and his general
agreement that a human embryo is not a person).'u In McCormick's words,
Robertson's defense is
breathtaking in the speed with which it subordinates every
consideration to.[the] usefulness [of cloning by blastomere separation]
in overcoming infertility. [Robertson's] thesis can be summarized as
follows: if it aids otherwise infertile couples to have children, it is
ethically acceptable . . . . [A]nything that is useful for overcoming
infertility is ethically acceptable.224
According to McCormick, Robertson is trying to create a consensus, not protect
an existing one. As Richard McCormick has noted, Robertson's analysis begs
all of these questions by focusing on one consideration-the desire of infertile
individuals-to the exclusion of all others, and this consideration is simply
declared to overcome all others.
B. The Limits of Roe
Roe v. Wade, properly understood on its own terms, dealt with a right to
"terminate pregnancy" and nothing more.' This right was defended on the
basis of the physical impact of pregnancy on a woman and her desire to rid
herself of the pregnancy.226  To use Professor John Robertson's words, Roe
involved "the physical burdens of bearing and giving birth. " 'r As the Court
noted in Harris v. McRae, "the Court in [Roe] emphasized the fact that the
woman's decision carries with it significant personal health implications-both
physical and psychological."" Roe created a negative right to terminate a
223. Compare Robertson, Question, supra note 17, at 6, with McCormick, supra note 24, at
14.
224. McCormick, supra note 24, at 14 (emphasis in original).
225. See 410 U.S. 113, 170 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) (noting that the Court previously
recognized "the right of a woman to decide whether or not to terminate her pregnancy").
226. Id. at 150 (discussing the risk to the woman, the Court concluded the state has an interest
in protecting the woman's own health and safety); id. at 153 (detailing the "detriment" to pregnant
woman by "denying this choice"); id. at 162 ("the rights of the pregnant woman at stake"). See
also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 508 U.S. 833, 852 (1992) ("The mother who carries a child to
full term is subject to anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain that only she must bear."). See also
id. at 869 (stating "the urgent claims of the woman to retain the ultimate control over her destiny
and her body").
227. Robertson, Procreative Libeny, supra note 70, at 416.
228. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980).
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pregnancy without social (governmental) limits; it did not establish a positive
liberty to procreation or a positive liberty in artificial, non-coital reproduction.
In other words, Roe created a right to avoid procreation, not a right to
procreate.
Planned Parenthood v. Casey affirmed this characterization of Roe.229
The central discussion of "terminating pregnancy" in Casey is concluded by a
reference to "these considerations of the nature of the abortion right."" 0
Likewise, when the Court in Eisenstadt v. Baird referred to "the decision
whether to bear or beget a child," 23 it was understood to refer to the literal
physical burden of pregnancy.232 According to Justice Blackmun, "terminating
pregnancy" is the central concept of the Roe liberty. 233
Thus, legislatures may intervene to protect human beings-the traditional
function of the criminal law and homicide law-as long as it falls outside the
context of abortion, and a state needs no other justification, as long as this
exercise of legislative authority does not interfere with woman's abortion liberty.
Furthermore, human beings do not have to be "persons" within the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The fact that a human being is not a constitutional
person within the Fourteenth Amendment does not mean that the legislature
cannot protect that human being within the homicide code, as states have in fact
done and as courts have in fact held. The states can protect any extracorporeal
human being under the homicide code because protecting the extracorporeal
embryo or human being does not interfere with the Court's limited abortion
right. The right to "procreative liberty" is a negative right and does not
encompass an affirmative power over extracorporeal embryos.
229. Casey, 505 U.S. at 845 ("the legitimate authority of the State respecting the termination
of pregnancies by abortion procedures"); id. (referring to "essential holding" of Roe as "right of the
woman to choose to have an abortion"); id. at 850 ("the profound moral and spiritual implications
of terminating a pregnancy"); id. at 852 ("the woman's interest in terminating her pregnancy"); id.
at 855 (describing Roe as "a rle . . . of personal autonomy and bodily integrity"); id. at 869
("freedom to terminate her pregnancy"); id. ("the right of the woman to terminate her pregnancy");
id. ("the woman's liberty to determine whether to carry her pregnancy to full term"); id. at 870 ("a
right to choose to terminate her pregnancy"); id. at 871 ("[t]he woman's right to terminate her
pregnancy"); id. at 872 ("a right to choose to terminate or continue her pregnancy"); id. at 876
("the right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy").
230. Id. at 875.
231. 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
232. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 875 (quoting Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453).
233. See, e.g., id. at 927-28 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("a woman's right to terminate her
pregnancy") ("continue pregnancies they might otherwise terminate") ("the right to terminate
pregnancies").
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The limits of Roe are also evident in the abortion-funding line of cases. In
Maher v. Roe,2" the Court held that "the right protects the woman from
unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate
her pregnancy." 25  In Harris v. McRae,236 the Supreme Court again
referred, more than once, to the Roe liberty as "the freedom of a woman to
decide whether to terminate a pregnancy. 237  The funding cases demonstrate
that the states may "make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion"
and "implement that judgment" by the use of public funding.238 This was
reaffirmed in Casey.
The fact that the abortion liberty expressly and forcefully excludes men,
even married men, from any right whatsoever in the abortion decision also
demonstrates the limits of the Roe abortion liberty. The father of "the
developing child" (as Casey used the phrase239), even the woman's husband,
has no right to spousal consent (Danforth) or even spousal notice (Casey). The
courts have summarily rejected many attempts by men to intercede and have a
share in the decision-making process. 2" Men have no legal right to be
involved in abortion decision-making, and, formally, the decision is the
woman's. Roe saw the decision-making as between the woman and her doctor
only,2 4 1 and, as the plurality stated in Casey, "[w]hat is at stake is the
woman's right to make the ultimate decision." 242  The Casey plurality
described, at great length, the total exclusion of the father or spouse from
decision-making. 243  Legal commentators who reject legal regulation of IVF
are inclined to wax eloquently over the involvement of "couples" in "decisions
about whether and when to bear children," but fathers (and spouses) are strictly
and absolutely excluded from the Roe framework and abortion decision-
making. 2"
234. 432 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1977) ("the right protects the woman from unduly burdensome
interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy").
235. Id. at 473-74.
236. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
237. Id. at 312. See also id. at 316 ("the freedom of a woman to decide whether to terminate
her pregnancy") (three times on the same page).
238. Id. at 314; Maher v. Roe, 431 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1977).
239. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992).
240. See, e.g., Conn v. Conn, 525 N.E.2d 612 (Ind. Ct. App.), aff'd, 526 N.E.2d 958 (Ind.),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 955 (1988); Smith v. Doe, 530 N.E.2d 331 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988), cert.
denied, 492 U.S. 919 (1989).
241. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156 (1973).
242. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
243. Id. at 887-98.
244. See, e.g., Lori B. Andrews, The Legal Status of the Embryo, 32 LOY. L. REV. 357, 359
(1986).
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Even the proponents of a broad right to non-coital procreation fairly admit
the limits of Roe. Thus, such a familiar advocate as John Robertson states:
In the United States, the right to avoid reproduction by contraception
and abortion is now firmly established. Whether single or married,
adult or minor, a woman has a right to terminate pregnancy up to
viability,245 and both men and women have the right to obtain and
use contraceptives.
The right to procreate-to bear, beget and rear children-has
received less explicit legal recognition . . . . [N]o cases (with the
possible exception of Skinner v. Oklahoma) turn on the recognition of
such a right. However, dicta in cases ranging from Meyer v.
Nebraska to Eisenstadt v. Baird clearly show a strong presumption in
favor of marital decisions to found a family. 246
Again, Robertson has noted the limits to Roe elsewhere, referring to "a
woman's decision not to conceive or bear a child":
Even though the Court has eliminated most of the legal limitations on
the right to avoid pregnancy, the freedom not to procreate is still
circumscribed by a number of restrictions. One such restriction
derives from the negative nature of constitutional protections, which
shield individuals from state interference with their liberty but do not
guarantee them the means to exercise those rights.2 7
245. This misrepresents the scope of the Roe liberty. Roe did not limit the abortion liberty to
viability. Instead, with the companion decision of Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), Roe
established a right to a "health" abortion throughout pregnancy (defined as "all factors-physical,
emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman's age-relevant to the well-being of the patient.
All these factors may relate to health"). Id. at 192. Several federal courts have given such a broad
reading to the "health" exception after viability. Women's Med. Prof. Corp. v. Voinovich, 130
F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1347 (1998) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the
denial of certiorari); ACOG v. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d 283, 299 (3d Cir. 1984), aff'd, 476 U.S. 747
(1986); Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. La. 1980); Schulte v. Douglas, 567 F.
Supp. 522 (D. Neb. 1981), aff'd sub nora, Women's Servs., P.C. v. Douglas, 710 F.2d 465 (8th
Cir. 1983) (per curiam). This "health" exception after viability was not altered in the Casey
decision. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (reaffirming "State's power to
restrict abortion after fetal viability, if the law contains exceptions for pregnancies which endanger
the woman's life or health"); id. at 878 (reaffirming Roe's holding "that 'subsequent to viability,
the State . . . may . . . regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in
appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.'"); id. at 871
("when the fetus is viable, prohibitions are permitted provided the life or health of the mother is not
at stake").
246. Robertson, Decisional Authority, supra note 162, at 290 (footnote omitted).
247. Robertson, Procreative Liberty, supra note 70, at 405 n.3.
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As one scholar has phrased it,
To charactize some or all of the cases on which the Court relies in
reaffirming Roe [in Casey] as standing for an abstract right to
"personal autonomy" simply creates an artificial common denominator
among a very disparate and largely unrelated group of cases while at
the same time denying what makes abortion unique.248
In any case, the issue is not coital versus noncoital as much as corporeal
versus extracorporeal reproduction (occurring or based outside the living body).
On several occasions, the Court has explicitly disavowed a right to use one's
body in whatever way desired. 49 While the "values and interests" of the
"coitally infertile" may be conceded and worthy of respect, it does not follow
that these may be pursued by whatever means or "techniques" possible or that
these means or "techniques" are entitled to the same respect. Some techniques
may be legitimate, while others are wholly illegitimate. And it does not follow
that any of the techniques are necessarily of constitutional dimension that
overrides other social and ethical judgments made through the democratic
process.
The limits of Roe are apparent, as well, from the joint opinion in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter. This opinion
shifted the basic rationale of the abortion liberty from privacy to the sociological
grounds of abortion as a backup for failed contraception and the "reliance
interests" of Americans.' The joint opinion again emphasized terminating
pregnancy as a backup to contraception, not a positive liberty to "procreate" by
any means, much less a liberty to extracorporeal reproduction.
Roe itself identified abortion as unique and "inherently different from
marital intimacy, or bedroom possession of obscene material, or marriage, or
procreation, or education, with which Eisenstadt and Griswold, Stanley, Loving,
248. Linton, supra note 128, at 31.
249. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (stating that "it is not clear to us that the claim
asserted by some amici that one has an unlimited right to do with one's body as one pleases bears
a close relationship to the right of privacy previously articulated in the Court's decisions"); Jacobson
v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (vaccination).
250. Casey, 505 U.S. at 835 (arguing that Roe could not be repudiated because "for two
decades of economic and social developments, people have organized intimate relationships and
made choices that define their views of themselves and their places in society, in reliance on the
availability of abortion in the event that contraception should fail").
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Skinner, and Pierce and Meyer were respectively concerned."" As Casey
demonstrates, Roe and abortion have both been treated as "sui generis, " n2
and the Casey plurality frankly stated that "abortion is a unique act. "z3
The courts have not gone beyond Roe's formulation since 1973, and no
trend among the lower federal courts alters this. One federal district court has
held that a state statute prohibiting experimentation on a fetus was both
unconstitutionally vague and violative of "a woman's fundamental right of
privacy, in particular, her right to make reproductive choices free of
governmental interference with those choices."' In a conclusory opinion,
without much reasoning, the court simply declared that embryo transfer and
chorionic villi sampling "fall within a woman's zone of privacy. "" Another
court has struck down a fetal experimentation statute on vagueness grounds
alone. 6 A third court has upheld a state statute prohibiting "use" of unborn
children "for experimentation."" One federal court has held that infertile
women fall within the coverage of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA)." Some state laws mandate insurance benefits for infertility, 259 but
these allowances, instances of legislative grace, are not constitutionally
compelled.
251. Roe, 410 U.S. at 159.
252. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857-58 (1992).
253. Id. at 852 ("the liberty of the woman is at stake in a sense unique to the human condition
and so unique in the law").
254. Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361, 1376 (N.D. 111. 1990), aff'd without opinion, 914
F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom., Scholberg v. Lifchez, 498 U.S. 1069 (1991).
255. Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1376. In a similar conclusion that passed for reasoning, the court
declared: "It takes no great leap of logic to see that within the cluster of constitutionally protected
choices that includes the right to have access to contraceptives, there must be included within that
cluster the right to submit to a medical procedure that may bring about, rather than prevent,
pregnancy." Id. at 1377. The image of a "cluster of constitutionally protected choices" was used
as a handy substitute for reasoning. While it may be logical to conclude, as a matter of precedent,
that a right to abortion for any reason within the first trimester includes a right to diagnosis of the
condition of the fetus, the same logic does not extend to the much different procedure of IVF.
256. Margaret S. v. Treen, 597 F. Supp. 636 (D. La. 1984), afdon other grounds, Margaret
S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994, 999 (5th Cir. 1986) ("the use of the terms 'experiment' and
'experimentation' makes the statute impermissibly vague"). See id. at 999 n. 13 ("This of course
does not imply that the states are powerless to regulate medical experimentation. . . . A statute
using more precise language . . . whether it applied to fetal experimentation or other forms of
medical research, would present a different case than the one we decided today.").
257. Jane L. v. Bangerter, 794 F. Supp. 1537 (D. Utah 1992) (reasoning that the statute
'requires only that a physician determine whether a procedure is performed merely to increase
general knowledge, or performed to benefit the pregnant woman or the unborn child. As long as
there is intent to benefit the fetus or the mother, the fetus is not being 'used for experimentation'")
(emphasis in original).
258. Bielicki v. City of Chicago, 1997 WL 260595 (N.D. 111. 1997).
259. See, e.g., 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/356m (West 1997).
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The broader formulation of a positive liberty in "procreation" that various
scholars propound is based on contemporary moral philosophy, not caselaw or
legal or constitutional history. Some would ground the concept of procreative
liberty in "choice" rather than physical integrity. For example, John Robertson
has written that "[tihe personal importance of a decision or activity, rather than
its secrecy from the gaze of others, determines its status as part of protected
privacy (or liberty, to be more precise). " "2w Professor Robertson's vision of
parenthood is the "wish to replicate themselves, transmit genes, gestate, and rear
children biologically related to them." 26 ' Robertson posits a right to "produce
a child for rearing that is genetically or gestationally related to one or both
partners. " " Entailed in such a right would be "discretion to create, freeze,
donate, transfer and discard embryos, because these maneuvers are necessary
to overcome coital infertility." He argues for "the right of persons to use
technology in pursuing their reproductive goals" 2" and for "presumptive
moral and legal protection for reproductive technologies that expand procreative
options."2" But Robertson's argument is declaratory and conclusory, not
reasoned: "If the moral right to reproduce presumptively protects coital
reproduction, then it should protect noncoital reproduction as well."2
The substantive due process basis for Roe is exceedingly thin. It cannot be
based on ordered liberty or any liberty interest deeply rooted in American
history or tradition. The Court in Webster and Casey abandoned that premise,
and no attempt was even made to reaffirm such a rationale. The rationale for
Roe shifted from substantive due process to stare decisis-maintaining the status
quo-and the rationale for maintaining the status quo was completely
sociological-the "reliance interest" in abortion as a backup to contraception.
The only substantive due process basis for Roe must be refashioned by
recreating the doctrine of substantive due process itself, by shifting from the 100
year judicial reliance on history and tradition to a modem reemphasis on the
strength of "interests" that are judicially defined and imposed. 21
260. Robertson, Decisional Authority, supra note 162, at 294 n.26.
261. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE, supra note 149, at 32.
262. Robertson, Decisional Authority, supra note 162, at 292.
263. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE, supra note 149, at 42.
264. Id. at 220.
265. Id. at 32.
266. Justice Souter appeared to be attempting such a revision in his concurring opinion in
Washington v. Glucksberg, which was joined by no other justice. 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2275-93 (1997)
(Souter, J., concurring). It heavily relied on a revisionist construction of Justice Harlan's opinion
in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). Justice Souter's opinion ignored the limitations of Poe v.
Ullman, enormously expanded its implications without warrant, and seriously distorted Justice
Harlan's opinion. See McConnell, supra note 199, at 698-700.
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The interests of infertile men, women, and couples in having children may
be exceedingly strong. Discovering that one is infertile may shake one's own
identity and challenge the strength of any marriage, perhaps severing the
relationship irreparably. Many people strongly desire to have children, and the
parent-child relationship has received legal protection virtually throughout
Anglo-American history. Nevertheless, there are obvious limits to the desire
for children, and people may be challenged to reexamine their most deeply-held
principles and beliefs and redirect their desires, relationships, commitments, and
life plans as they face these limits. However, desires alone, no matter how
strongly held, do not become part of American constitutional law simply because
they are strongly held. Yet, John Robertson and others essentially base the
"presumptive protection" for a nearly unlimited right to procreative liberty using
technology on strongly held desire.
Constitutional authority ultimately rests on the American people, not the
personally-assumed authority of unelected judges. Judges do not create their
own authority but derive it from the people and the constitutive acts of the
people in adopting a constitution and distributing political power among the
branches of government. It is clear from the unregulated nature of the infertility
industry-so widely noted in recent years-that the American people have
neither taken decision-making out of the political process nor enshrined it in the
Constitution. The American people have not exercised any constitutive will to
treat the infertility industry different from any other area of medicine or
commercial enterprise. Thus, the states retain the same authority to regulate or
prohibit infertility technologies as they do to regulate other branches of medical
technology. This general direction is confirmed by the general proposition that
there is no constitutional right to medical treatment. 267
Finally, since Roe, defenders of the abortion liberty have sometimes shifted
from a Due Process Clause rationale to an Equal Protection Clause rationale,
thus emphasizing the unique impact on women.' M To the extent that this is
persuasive, it directly undermines any right to human cloning. (For example,
Justice O'Connor, at oral argument in Vacco and Glucksberg, emphasized that
suicide (and death and dying) did not affect women uniquely but affected men
and women equally.) Applying this reasoning to cloning, a ban on human
cloning-and the protection of extracorporeal human embryos-would fall
equally on women and men, and a prohibition on somatic cell nuclear transfer
would apply equally to the cells of men and women. For these reasons, Roe and
its progeny cannot encompass a right to human cloning or somatic cell nuclear
transfer.
267. United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979).
268. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, SEX AND REASON 339-40 (1992) (noting such a shift).
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C. Differentiating Cruzan, Vacco, and Glucksberg
Proponents of unlimited procreative autonomy have relied on the expansive
language concerning autonomy in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,2" sometimes
called the "mystery" passage. The Casey plurality opinion stated: "At the heart
of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of
the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters
could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under
compulsion of the State. "270 But scholars have aptly argued that this passage
must be considered within the context of the plurality's entire opinion and its
emphasis on stare decisis. 7 ' Within that context, the passage should be most
accurately understood as rhetorical and not as prescriptive of any specific rights.
The Supreme Court's landmark decision in Washington v. Glucksberg,m
which held that the Due Process Clause does not protect any right to assisted
suicide, demonstrated the narrow scope of Casey. The Court in Glucksberg
identified the two strict requirements of substantive due process. First, the Due
Process Clause protects "those fundamental rights and liberties which are,
objectively, 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' and 'implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor justice would
exist if they were sacrificed.'"2" Second, a "careful description" of "the
asserted fundamental liberty interest" is required. 4  Initially, it must be
established that an asserted interest is fundamental so as to "avoid[] the need for
complex balancing of interests in every case."275 Then, the Court specifically
emphasized the limited nature of the "mystery" passage from Casey:
By choosing this language, the Court's opinion in Casey described, in
a general way and in light of our prior cases, those personal activities
and decisions that this Court has identified as so deeply rooted in our
history and traditions, or so fundamental to our concept of
constitutionally ordered liberty, that they are protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. The opinion moved from the recognition that
liberty necessarily includes freedom of conscience and belief about
ultimate considerations to the observation that "though the abortion
decision may originate within the zone of conscience and belief, it is
269. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
270. Id. at 851.
271. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, Against Assisted Suicide-Even a Very Limited Form, 72 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 735, 765-68 (1995).
272. 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
273. Id. at 2268 (citations omitted).
274. Id.
275. Id.
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more than a philosophic exercise." That many of the rights and
liberties protected by the Due Process Clause sound in personal
autonomy does not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all
important, intimate, and personal decisions are so protected, and
Casey did not suggest otherwise.276
Two of the three Justices who joined the Casey plurality opinion (O'Connor and
Kennedy) joined this opinion in Glucksberg.
The Court in Glucksberg also reaffirmed the limits of Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Dept of Health." The right recognized by the Supreme Court in
Cruzan was a right to "refuse unwanted medical treatment," not a "right to
treatment" and not a "right to die."278 This right is properly seen as a right
to refuse medical treatment-based in bodily integrity and the common law
doctrine of informed consent-and not a right to "bodily expression." As the
Court stated in Glucksberg,
The right assumed in Cruzan . . . was not simply deduced from
abstract concepts of personal autonomy. Given the common-law rule
that forced medication was a battery, and the long legal tradition
protecting the decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment, our
assumption was entirely consistent with this Nation's history and
constitutional traditions.79
Furthermore, the Court stated in Cruzan, and reaffirmed in Glucksberg, that
the states have an "unqualified interest in the preservation of human life. " "a°
As the Court stated in response to the contention in Glucksberg that the state's
interest in life only applies to "those who can still contribute to society and
enjoy life":
[The State of] Washington, however, has rejected this sliding-scale
approach and, through its assisted-suicide ban, insists that all persons'
lives, from beginning to end, regardless of physical or mental
condition, are under the full protection of the law. See United States
v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 558 . . . (1979) (". , . Congress could
reasonably have determined to protect the terminally ill, no less than
276. Id. at 2271 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
277. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
278. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2270.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 2272 (quoting Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280, 282, and the Model Penal Code § 210.5
cmt. 5: "The interests in the sanctity of life that are represented by the criminal homicide laws are
threatened by one who expresses a willingness to participate in taking the life of another").
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other patients, from the vast range of self-styled panaceas that
inventive minds can devise"). As we have previously affirmed, the
States "may properly decline to make judgments about the 'quality' of
life that a particular individual may enjoy," Cruzan, 497 U.S., at 282,
• .. This remains true, as Cruzan makes clear, even for those who
are near death.2"'
Although this interest in Glucksberg applies to the end of life, there is no
reason-outside the strict constraints of Roe and bodily pregnancy-why this
unqualified interest does not apply equally to both ends, or all stages, of human
life. Thus, just as the states may decline to "make judgments about the 'quality'
of life that a particular individual may enjoy," and enjoin assisted suicide despite
an individual "interest" in assisted suicide, so too the states may protect
extracorporeal human embryos despite varying notions about "personhood" or
the interests of infertile individuals.
VI. LEGAL LIMITS ON HUMAN CLONING
A. The Interests Promoted by Human Cloning
Scientists cloned the Scottish sheep, Dolly, because they saw obvious
utilitarian benefits to animal and plant cloning." Raising animals and altering
their breeding and genetic potential have long been widely accepted parts of
animal husbandry. It even has biblical roots in the thirtieth chapter of Genesis
and the account of Jacob and his flocks.28 The motive for cloning mammals,
of which the Scottish sheep, Dolly, was one of the first, "was to achieve
beneficial and marketable technologies in the production of agricultural animals
and the mass production of previously rare and valuable pharmaceuticals."24
The cloning of trees is desired "to preserve their genetic diversity and spur
reforestation. "285
The utilitarian considerations that are appropriate for plants and animals,
however, cannot ethically be extended to humans. To do so violates a
fundamental principle of human rights-to treat human beings as ends and not
as means. 286 Because it is unethical to use human beings for experiments
281. Id.
282. See, e.g., CQ Interview, supra note 52, at 121-40.
283. See Genesis 30.
284. John R.G. Turner, Ewe Two, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1997, § 7, at 1. See also CQ
Interview, supra note 52, at 122.
285. Sue Ellen Christian, New Shade of Tree Preservation Involves Cloning of the Giants, CHII.
TRn., Dec. 26, 1997, § 1, at 1.
286. See, e.g., TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL
ETHICS 7 (1979).
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without their consent, it is unethical to use human embryos for
experimentation-no valid consent can be given for them. And, yet, that is the
essential reason for human cloning and embryo experimentation generally-to
use human beings and to maximize benefits through performing experiments on
them.
Perhaps the three most compelling utilitarian reasons for human cloning
research are to enhance the ability to do prenatal diagnosis and detect genetic
defects in the embryo leading to eugenic abortion, to gain knowledge derived
from cloning embryos that may result in new therapies (such as transplantation)
to treat disease, and to produce children for infertile couples." a  Thus, the
NBAC referred to "important social values, such as protecting the widest
possible sphere of personal choice, particularly in matters pertaining to
procreation and child rearing, maintaining privacy and the freedom of scientific
inquiry, and encouraging the possible development of new biomedical
breakthroughs."288
The contributions of human cloning research and embryo experimentation
to new medical therapies, however, are almost entirely speculative. The NIH
Human Embryo Research Panel in 1994 speculated about similar developments
from embryo experimentation in its report. Daniel Callahan, President of the
Hastings Institute, expressed a healthy skepticism about such speculations:
How are we to go about establishing some kind of moral
proportionality between the claims of research . . . and that of the
'moral weight" of the embryo?... Though the report sets up a clear
moral tension between those two goods, it is utterly silent on how
research claims and possibilities should be evaluated for their moral
weight and benefit.... [N]ot a word [is] devoted to the moral status
of proposed research or the criteria necessary for establishing some
kind of proportionality. What a free ride this is for the researchers,
whose claims of potential benefits are treated with the kind of
deference and credulity not seen since the days when the golden calf
was worshipped. But of course for modem medicine research is the
golden calf, questioned only at one's own risk. Duly reverential, the
panel satisfied itself with simply listing all the research possibilities,
including the improvement and increased safety of IVF, the creation
of cell lines that might someday be useful for bone marrow
287. See, e.g., Robert Edwards, Ethics and Embryos: The Case for Experimentation, in
EXPERIMENTS ON EMBRYOS 42, 50 (Anthony Dyson & John Harris eds., 1990); John Harris,
Embryos and Hedgehogs: On the Moral Status of the Embryo, in EXPERIMENTS ON EMBRYOS 75-76
(Anthony Dyson & John Harris eds., 1990).
288. NBAC REPORT, supra note 5, at ii.
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transplantation, repair of spinal code injuries, skin replacement and,
naturally, the hint of a greater understanding of cancer. Was not a
little skepticism in order here? ... Could not anyone have thought
to ask how the possibilities of increased knowledge through embryo
research compare with the myriad other possibilities of research that
can also be pursued without the use of embryos?" 9
A similar skepticism is due the speculative claims of medical advances from
human cloning. A recent medical journal article, supporting human cloning
research, was elusive in setting forth any prospective medical benefits from
experimentation on cloned human embryos. 2" The authors inadvertently made
clear how tenuous are the claims of medical benefits, pointed out that beneficial
research for humans has been derived from animals, and could not deny that
alternative therapies or research avenues exist.
One of the most commonly argued reasons for human cloning is infertility.
Cloning will be a handmaiden to IVF. Some couples undergoing IVF who
"cannot produce enough viable embryos to initiate pregnancy" might arguably
seek cloning by blastomere separation or somatic cell nuclear transfer.2 9'
Human cloning, it has been argued, is justified as just an "incremental step
beyond what we are already doing with artificial insemination, IVF, fertility
enhancing drugs, and genetic manipulation. "292 But, as Robertson states,
"[s]cientific zeal and the profit motive combine with the desire of infertile
couples for biologic offspring to create an enormous power to manipulate the
earliest stages of human life in infertility centers across the country."29 While
the anguish of infertile women and couples may be great, it does not logically
follow that they may seek any means to counteract that infertility or to have a
289. Daniel Callahan, The Puzzle of Profound Respect, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Jan.-Feb. 1995,
at 39.
290. See Jerome P. Kassirer & Nadia A. Rosenthal, Should Human Cloning Research Be off
Limits?, 338 NEw ENG. J. MED. 905 (1998). Kassirer and Rosenthal argued:
Research on somatic-cell nuclear transfer might yield numerous benefits. Studies
of stem-cell differentiation could provide valuable information about the mechanism of
aging or the cause of cancer. Stem cells derived from this technology might also be a
rich source of material for transplantation if specific genes or sets of genes in their
pluripotent stem cells could be activated and if, as has been described before, the cells
could then be coaxed to differentiate. Such a possibility is not strictly theoretical....
The treatment of such diseases as diabetes mellitus, leukemia, and genetic disorders
might change dramatically with the availability of genetically altered cell lines that
would be immunologically compatible with a given patient and therefore not seen by the
immune system as foreign.
Id. at 905.
291. Id.
292. Laurence Tribe, Second Thoughts on Cloning, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1997, at A23.
293. Robertson, Question, supra note 17, at 7.
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particular child to their liking. There is no "right" to a "perfect child," as
demonstrated by the long legal tradition against infanticide. It follows that there
is no right to a genetically perfect or genetically identical child. Put simply,
there is no right to a child by any means.
There are times when scientific knowledge is greatly desired but not
morally obtainable. At those times, one must pursue other avenues or wait until
that knowledge can be obtained ethically.2" Alternatives to cloning and
embryo experimentation in general do exist, such as obtaining stem cells from
other sources, such as umbilical cord blood. Much of the interest in human
embryo experimentation is due to the unique nature of stem cells in the early
embryo-cells that are undifferentiated and theoretically may be used to promote
healthy cell growth in other humans. These other, morally permissible avenues
can and must be pursued in light of the ethical obstacles to human embryo
experimentation.
Other potential uses of cloning seem more remote, more weakly argued,
less likely to garner public support, or more typical of the Frankenstein-type of
scenarios that may have driven early public disapproval of cloning. 2" These
lesser purposes might include "the possibility of creating genetically enhanced
clones with a particular talent or a resistance to some dread disease" or
replacing a lost child "whose biological 'rebirth' might offer solace, or creating
organ donors (on the supposition that genetic similarity will reduce organ
rejection). "29 (In light of public misperceptions, it is possible that if
implantation of cloned embryos is prohibited and the prospect of replicating
adult human beings is avoided, public disapproval of cloning, manipulating, and
killing human embryos will spark little public disapproval or attract any notice
at all.)
294. PAUL RAMSEY. THE PATIENT AS PERSON xi-xxii (1973).
295. But this does not prevent scientists from publicly speculating about the utilitarian benefits.
As Lee Silver told the London Sunday Times, "[i]t would almost certainly be possible to produce
human bodies without a forebrain. These human bodies without any semblance of consciousness
would not be considered persons, and thus it would be perfectly legal to keep them 'alive' as a
future source of organs." Charles Krauthammer, Of Headless Mice... And Men, TIME, Jan. 19,
1998, at 76 (quoting from the interview).
296. Tribe, supra note 292, at A23. Cf. Laurence H. Tribe, Technology Assessment and the
Fourth Discontinuity: The Limits of Instrumental Rationality, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 617, 649 (1973).
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There are obvious eugenic considerations that are inextricably intertwined
with cloning. 2" The earliest comments on human cloning in the late 1960s
saw the eugenic potential in it,298 and, since the 1960s, discussion of cloning
has routinely been associated with eugenic desires. Nobel laureate James D.
Watson explained to Congress that "[s]ome people may very sincerely believe
the world desperately needs many copies of the really exceptional people if we
are to fight our way out of the ever-increasing computer-mediated complexity
that makes our individual brains so frequently inadequate."2 99 The prospect
of cloning humans with favorable traits is already being discussed positively.
Karl Drlica explained how this might occur:
For example, our search for defective, disease-causing genes will
eventually reveal particular forms of genes that give especially
desirable characteristics. Then we'll be able to identify human
embryos that have favorable traits. At an early stage of development,
embryo cells can be separated and each grown into a new embryo.
Embryos survive freezing, so the clones can be stored until needed.
Selective implantation of "gifted" embryos into prospective mothers
will then produce "super-babies." When in place, embryo selection
procedures are likely to be expensive, so only privileged groups or
certain high-tech nations will have access. While this scenario is still
considered science fiction by most, the necessary technology is
developing rapidly." °°
Such eugenic interests are subject to regulation within the state's traditional
police powers.
297. See, e.g., Bentley Glass, Endless Horizons or Golden Age? 171 Sc!. 23, 28 (1971);
JOSHUA LEDERBERG, AMERICAN NATURALIST (1966); Pizzulli, Asexual Reproduction, supra note
15, at 489-90, 498-99 (citing the "eugenic potential" of cloning); Tribe, supra note 296, at 647-49;
James D. Watson, Moving Toward Clonal Man, 227 ATLANTIC MAG. 50 (1971) [hereinafter
Watson, Clonal Man].
298. See, e.g., Joseph Fletcher, Ethical Aspects of Genetic Controls, 285 NEW ENG. J. MED.
776 (1971); Joshua Lederberg, Experimental Genetics andHuman Evolution, 100 AM. NATURALIST
519 (1966); Joshua Lederberg, Unpredictable Variety Still Rules Human Reproduction, WASH. POST,
Sept. 30, 1967, at A17; Watson, Clonal Man, supra note 297, at 50. See also Pizzulli,
Constitutional Analysis, supra note 15, at 282-83 nn.21-22 (citing government hearings).
299. KOLATA, supra note 2, at 83.
300. KARL DRLICA, DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD: THE PROMISES AND RISKS OF THE GENETIC
REVOLUTION 3 (1994).
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B. The Interests Protected by Prohibiting Cloning
Some concerns about human cloning may never be realized or may simply
be novelties but not harms. Yet, the claims of implausible dangers should not
distract from the real harms that have been identified.
1. Preventing Experimentation on and Death of Human Beings
Human cloning, and the process of developing that technology, will
inevitably involve creating, manipulating, and killing individual members of the
human species, i.e., human beings. (Killing is not a rhetorical word, but simply
the straight-forward use of the dictionary definition."°  We may "discard"
things, because things do not die, but we "kill" living beings by causing their
death. The very use of the term "discard"-as is typical in most ethical
discussions of embryo experimentation-reduces the living human embryo to a
thing.) Indeed, congressional testimony and debates indicate that it is precisely
the ambition of scientists to do research on such developing human entities, with
the "disposal" of many or most. John Robertson vividly describes the casual
treatment of extracorporeal human embryos.'
Cloning will inevitably involve the non-therapeutic experimentation on, and
the killing of, human embryos.' Under the common law, all human beings
were persons. Several international codes of medical ethics avoid making any
distinction between human beings and persons by addressing the interests of
"human beings" and "human subjects." For example, the Nuremburg Code of
1947 limited experimentation on the "human subject," requiring that "voluntary
consent" be "absolutely essential."' Experimentation is not permitted on
"human subjects" without "legal capacity to give consent" and cannot be
continued if "a continuation of the experiment is likely to result in injury,
disability, or death to the experimental subject. " Likewise, the Declaration
of Geneva of 1948 declares: "I will maintain the utmost respect for human life
from conception."' Similarly, on November 20, 1959, the United Nations
in its Declaration of the Rights of the Child stated: "The child, by reason of his
301. See, e.g., AMERICAN HERITAGE STUDENT DICTIONARY 546 (1994) (defining "kill": "To
cause the death of; deprive of life"); WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 661 (1987)
("Kill merely states the fact of death caused by an agency in any manner.").
302. Robertson, Question, supra note 17, at 7.
303. NBAC REPORT, supra note 5, at 63-64.
304. United States v. Brandt (The Medical Case), 2 Trials of War Criminals Before the
Nuremburg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, at 181-82 (1949).
305. 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 2763 (Warren Thomas Reich ed., rev. ed. 1995).
306. See World Medical Association, Declaration of Geneva (1948), reprinted in 5
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 2646-47 (Warren T. Reich ed., rev. ed. 1995) [hereinafter Declaration
of Geneva].
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physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, including
appropriate legal protection, before as well as after birth."' Under these
contemporary, authoritative ethical standards, human cloning cannot be justified.
This is most clearly true regarding intentionally cloning human beings for
research without intending to implant them. The cloning of children for genetic
identity is not "therapeutic."' As Daniel Callahan has noted, it is easy to
imagine some good coming from unethical acts, but this does not justify the
good that results.'
The development of human cloning will inevitably involve the creation of
new human lives who will be killed due to failed attempts. The cloning of the
Scottish sheep reportedly took 277 attempts before the renucleated ovum was
brought to maturity.310 Similar attempts in humans would result in similar
failures. Abnormalities in extracorporal embryos will inevitably be produced,
prompting their destruction.3 '
It is precisely the prerogative of society to give respect to the dignity of
these growing human beings and to require that other individuals give equal
dignity and respect. Anglo-American law has always treated human beings, and
the human species, as special and uniquely protected it through homicide law.
The law of homicide exists to protect human beings, at different stages of
development and existence, who are maltreated, marginalized, or dehumanized.
This special treatment was part religious and part empirical. The justification
for this special treatment is not just "in the genes."312 Genes are not all that
matter. Human beings are not just a sum of their genes. Instead, it is the
human species that is special, and the genetic code signifies a member of the
human species. For example, even before modem science fully developed,
scientists observed that cross-species fertilization did not occur in humans. And,
ironically, it is the human capacity for self-consciousness (more than subjective
expression), so much touted by those who deny personhood until rational
attributes are actually expressed, that marks the human species as special and
deserving of the special protection of the law.
307. Preamble, Declaration of the Rights of the Child, 14th Sess. of U.N. Gen. Assem.,
F.A.Res. 1286, 14 U.N.W. GAOR Supp. 16, at 19 (U.N. Doc. A1435) (1959).
308. Kass, Wisdom of Repugnance, supra note 23, at 24-25.
309. CQ Interview, supra note 52, at 132.
310. Id. ("Dolly was derived from one out of 277 oocytes that we used. We don't know if that
was unlucky and we could get that rate higher, as we have done with the embryo cells. We don't
know that it wasn't a lucky one out of 277. Maybe the true rate is one out of 10,000.") (interview
with Grahame Bulfield, Director and Chief Executive of Roslin Institute).
311. Id. at 139.
312. See, e.g., MORTIMER ADLER, THE DIFFERENCE OF MAN AND THE DIFFERENCE IT MAKES
(1967).
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In contemporary moral philosophy and culture, a vast divide exists between
the philosophy that the human is special and the notion that human status is not
enough to deserve respect and protection. This attitude is exemplified by Helga
Kuhse and Peter Singer:
To claim that every human being has a right to life solely because it
is biologically a member of the species Homo sapiens is to make
species membership the basis of rights. This is as indefensible as
making race membership the basis of rights. It is the form of
prejudice one of us has elsewhere referred, to as "speciesism," a
prejudice in favour of members of one's own species, simply because
they are members of one's own species. . . . If we are to attribute
rights on morally defensible grounds, we must base them on some
morally relevant characteristics of the beings to whom we attribute
rights. Examples of such morally relevant characteristics would be
consciousness, autonomy, rationality, and so on, but not race or
species. Hence, although it may be possible to claim with strict literal
accuracy that a human life exists from conception, it is not possible to
claim that a human life exists from conception in the sense of a being
which possesses, even at the most minimal level, the capacities
distinctive of most human beings. Yet it is on the possession of these
capacities that the attribution of a right to life, or of any other special
moral status must be based. 313
Nevertheless, the entire thrust of Anglo-American jurisprudence is that the
human is special. While the recognition of humans as special and deserving of
certain rights did not start with the Declaration of Independence, certainly the
Declaration provides the most illustrious and authoritative example of that
human life-affirming philosophy in the American political tradition.
Inevitably, if a general policy of research on developing members of the
human species, i.e., human beings, is allowed after conception and before a
certain cell stage, that cell stage, that line, will soon be crossed in the interest
of further research on that more developed entity. If such judgment is left to
individual researchers, such lines will be crossed, both progressively and
incrementally, as an inevitable product of intellectual curiosity or scientific
interest.
313. Kuhse & Singer, supra note 151, at 60.
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2. Preserving Human Freedom and Dignity
Beyond the concerns regarding experimentation on cloned embryos are the
concerns about implanting a cloned embryo and nurturing it to birth. In his
testimony before Congress, Leon Kass, a biochemist and ethicist from the
University of Chicago, provided the most acute critical analysis of human
cloning to date. 3"4  Kass has summarized several ethical objections to the
cloning of human beings:
[C]loning threatens confusion of identity and individuality . . .
cloning represents a giant step . . . toward transforming procreation
into manufacture, that is, toward the increasing depersonalization of
the process of generation and, increasingly, toward the 'production' of
human children as artifacts, products of human will and design (.
'commodification' of new life); and cloning.., represents a form of
despotism of the cloners over the cloned, and thus . . . represents a
blatant violation of the inner meaning of parent-child relations, of what
it means to have a child ... .
He also pointed out that any attempt to clone a human being would constitute an
unethical experiment upon the resulting child because no consent could be
obtained from the child who was produced. 316  The NBAC referred to "a
possibly diminished sense of individuality and personal autonomy."37
Clearly, human cloning by any means (whether by somatic cell nuclear transfer
or blastomere separation) treats unborn human beings as means, not ends, and
they would be evaluated and valued precisely because of their subjective
attributes.
Cloning would give parents, doctors, and others ever greater control over
other human lives, allowing these individuals to impose their own highly
subjective values. Clearly, human cloning is neither therapeutic to the mother
nor the human being cloned, but is instead elective. Cloning is only the most
recent and highly publicized example of how technology always involves the
power of some people over other people. 3I" As the late Oxford/Cambridge
scholar, C.S. Lewis, has written, "the power of Man to make himself what he
314. Versions of this testimony have been published in The New Republic and the Valparaiso
University Law Review. See sources cited supra note 23.
315. Kass, Wisdom of Repugnance, supra note 23, at 21.
316. Id. at 22-23.
317. NBAC REPORT, supra note 5. at ii. See also John Finnis, Public Reason, Abortion, and
Cloning, 32 VAL. U. L. REv. 361 (1998).
318. See generally PAUL RAMSEY, FABRICATED MAN: THE ETHICS OF GENETIC CONTROL
(1970); C.S. LEWls, THE ABOLITION OF MAN (1950).
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pleases means . . . the power of some men to make other men what they
please. "319 Of course, education-to a greatly limited extent-has always
involved a similar power. But, as Lewis points out, "[iln the older systems both
the kind of man the teachers wished to produce and their motives for producing
him were prescribed by the Tao-a norm to which the teachers themselves were
subject and from which they claimed no liberty to depart. They did not cut men
to some pattern they had chosen. " 320
Even the most sympathetic scenario that might be imagined for human
cloning-the genetic replacement of a lost child-shows instead the
impersonalization of the child. The notion that cloning the child will replace the
child assumes a serious fallacy-that children are their genes. We know that
children are at least their genes, but they are more than their genes. Instead,
genetics tells us what we come to understand as human nature flourishes and the
person matures. Children are not fungible; they are unique and cannot simply
be replaced.
3. Diminishing Parental Ties, Increasing Parental Control
Cloning involves a striking mixture of diminishing parental ties with total
parental control over the genetic destiny of the child. Each tendency is wrong-
headed. Together, they will lead to great impersonalization in parent-child
relationships, as human cloning will likely coarsen the relationship between
parents and cloned children. The NBAC referred to a "concern about a
degradation in the quality of parenting and family life." 3 2' With cloning,
children will be manufactured, and not simply manufactured but manufactured
for highly subjective and particular reasons. Because of highly subjective
criteria, cloned children will be conditionally accepted. In fact, if the conditions
are not satisfied, they will most likely not be born at all-the embryos will be
"discarded." Such conditional acceptance treats children as commodities or
possessions. Consequently, "family relationships are necessarily diminished,
turned into merely contractual relationships between autonomous
individuals. "'
319. LEWIS, supra note 318, at 37.
320. Id. at 38.
321. NBAC REPORT, supra note 5, at ii.
322. Allen Verhey, Theology After Dolly, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Mar. 19-26, 1997, at 285,
285.
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As Leon Kass has testified:
[Ciloning represents a giant step (though not the first one) toward
transforming procreation into manufacture, that is, toward the
increasing depersonalization of the process of generation and,
increasingly toward the "production" of human children as artifacts,
products of human will and design (what others have called the
problem of "commodification" of new life); and cloning-like other
form of eugenic engineering of the next generation-represents a form
of despotism of the cloners over the cloned, and thus (even in
benevolent cases) represents a blatant violation of the inner meaning
of parent-child relations, of what it means to have a child, of what it
means to say "yes" to our own demise and "replacement.""
This detachment between children and parents is not speculative, but is
already evident in sperm and egg donation cases. The California case of
Buzzanca v. Buzzanca demonstrates this detachment." Jaycee Buzzanca was
conceived from anonymous sperm and egg donors and born in 1995 to a
surrogate mother (with her husband's consent), as contracted by John and
Luanne Buzzanca. The Buzzancas separated shortly after Jaycee was conceived
and subsequently divorced. Luanne Buzzanca, who had custody of Jaycee since
birth but had not adopted her, was "the only one of the six people who helped
create her to claim parental rights" and sued John Buzzanca for child
support.3" A California Superior Court judge ruled that Jaycee had no legal
parents, but the California Court of Appeals reversed. Advocates for Jaycee
argued that the court should focus on what is best for the child and not on the
biological status of the Buzzancas, and the ACLU contended that the child has
a "right to have parents" that supercedes the lack of legal precedent in
California. The California Court of Appeals explicitly urged the state legislature
to address the situation through legislation because "[t]hese cases will not go
away. "326 The way to give meaning to "the child's right to have parents,"
however, is by preserving biological links and preventing detached, asexual
reproduction through cloning, not by imposing parental responsibilities, after the
fact, on people who do not have a biological link with the child.
Cloning would overturn the traditional rule of Anglo-American
jurisprudence that limits parental authority over the life and health of children.
The common law's protection of vulnerable human life is reflected in its clear
323. Kass, Wisdom of Repugnance, supra note 23, at 21.
324. Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
325. Ann Davis, Artificial-Reproduction Arrangers Are Ruled Child's Legal Parents, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 11, 1998, at B2.
326. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 293.
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repudiation of the absolute power of the Roman father over the life of the child
and its elevation of legal protection for human life. Blackstone pointed out this
contrast. 27 Supreme Court Justice James Wilson emphasized the common law
protection for the unborn and newborn child:
I shall certainly be excused from adducing any formal arguments
to evince, that life, and whatever is necessary for the safety of life, are
the natural rights of man. Some things are so difficult; others are so
plain, that they cannot be proved. It will be more to our purpose to
show the anxiety, with which some legal systems spare and preserve
human life; the levity and the cruelty which others discover in
destroying or sporting with it; and the inconsistency, with which, in
others, it is, at some times, wantonly sacrificed, and, at other times,
religiously guarded.
.. [I]n Sparta, if an infant, newly born, appeared, to those who
were appointed to examine him, ill formed or unhealthy, he was,
without any further ceremony, thrown into a gulph near mount
Taygetus ...
At Athens, the parent was empowered, when a child was born,
to pronounce on its life or its death ...
... [Alt Rome, the son held his life by the tenure of his father's
pleasure ....
With consistency, beautiful and undeviating, human life, from its
commencement to its close, is protected by the common law. In the
contemplation of law, life begins when the infant is first able to stir in
the womb. By the law, life is protected not only from immediate
destruction, but from every degree of actual violence, and, in some
cases, from every degree of danger.32
327. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 70, at *440.
328. 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 596-97 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967). See also
ADAM SMITH, LEcrI.RES ON JURISPRUDENCE 172-75 (Ronald Lindley Meek et al. eds., 1978)
(Liberty Classics Reprint 1982).
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Wilson concluded that " [t ihe formidable power of a Roman father is unknown
to the common law. But it vests in the parent such authority as is conducive to
the advantage of the child."329 Apparently, this sentiment was familiar to
lawyers during the Founding era, because it is also reflected in the legal training
of John Quincy Adams, who observed that the common law "has restrained
within proper bounds, even the sacred rights of parental authority, and shewn
the cruelty, and the absurdity of abandoning an infant to destruction for any
deformity in its bodily frame .... 30 To paraphrase Justice Harlan, this is
a tradition from which we have broken.33'
Based on the common law principle that parental authority must be used to
promote the life and health of the child, states have limited parental control that
threatens the life or health of the child. For example, parental beliefs against
medical treatment can be overridden to preserve the life and health of the child,
and parents may be held responsibility for the death of the child if medical
treatment is not provided. The states have a related interest in limiting parental
control over the genetic destiny of a child.
The novelty of human cloning does not make it bad. Rather, it is bad
because it involves a total control over the genetic future of a child, an
empowerment made possible by novel technology. A moment's reflection
reveals that parents may undertake any number of acts that would involve
unwarranted control over the life and destiny of children: locking them up in
a room indefinitely, or depriving them of light, food, social contacts, or
education. None of these acts would have to be permanent to be seen as
unjustified; none would be as permanent as cloning. A curious phenomenon
among contemporary ethicists is that many, including a good number who are
children of the Sixties who resented parental authority, are now advocating an
exercise of total parental control through genetic engineering.
A certain balanced and well-considered desire to have children is an
enduring aspiration that is entitled to qualified respect. That qualification goes
to the means of acquiring children and the quality of that aspiration. Cloning,
as a handmaiden to IVF, is not about children; rather, it is about adults and their
desires. Consideration of the well-being of the child is not primary. IVF is
about adults wanting to be parents of certain children or a certain type of
child.332 IVF cannot be about children as children because IVF entails the
destruction of some, perhaps many, unborn human beings. Acceptance is
329. WILSON, supra note 328, at 604.
330. 2 DIARY OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 1786-1788, at 193 (Robert J. Taylor et al. ed., 1981).
331. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
332. See, e.g., John A. Robertson, Genetic Selection of Offspring Characteristics, 76 B.U. L.
REV. 421 (1996).
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always conditional. In the world of IVF, the developing human being is
something akin to property, as the Tennessee Supreme Court's decision in Davis
v. Davis333 makes clear. While the Tennessee Supreme Court did not
explicitly say that the developing embryo was property-perhaps lacking the
courage of their convictions-the implication was clear. Human cloning extends
to an extreme this general tendency to value children who are produced through
artificial means as property.
The compelling societal interests against human cloning cannot be protected
short of a prohibition against its practice. Once cloned, the embryo's genetic
identity is formed and controlled and, while subject to further possible
experimentation, it cannot be unaltered. Once cloned, it is not possible to
effectively protect the life of the extracorporeal embryo. Requiring implantation
is inconceivable due to traditional legal and moral principles against battery,
forced sex, or compelled medical treatment, and placing them for "adoption"
would entail the use of freezing techniques that carry a high risk of death or
injury. Requiring implantation would also be futile because, as soon as the
embryo would be implanted, the woman would have a liberty interest to abort
under Roe. The only effective way to protect the human embryo is to avoid
completely the perilous spector of cloning by prohibiting it altogether.
VII. CONCLUSION
As Professor Gilbert Meilaender testified to the NBAC on human cloning,
"sometimes we may only come to understand the nature of the road we are on
when we have already traveled fairly far along it."" Human cloning is the
logical outcome and the most recent extension of twenty years of embryo
experimentation and manipulation. However, it is the most subtle extension of
that technique and the accompanying philosophy in its denigration of human
dignity. Human cloning proceeds on a cramped, artificial, and impersonal view
of human beings and reflects the dehumanizing spirit of Aldous Huxley's Brave
New World. The impersonal instinct that fosters the intent to control the genetic
destiny of one's progeny comes from the same instinct that treats the human
embryo as just a clump of cells. Hopefully, the publicity and analysis given to
human cloning will illuminate and educate Americans on the entire misguided
effort of human embryo experimentation and manipulation.
333. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992). See also Kass v. Kass, No. 53, 1998 N.Y. LEXIS 1022,
at *1 (N.Y. May 7, 1998).
334. Gilbert Meilaender, Begetting and Cloning, FIRST THINGS, June-July 1997, at 41,43. See
also Gilbert Meilaender, Cloning in Protestant Perspective, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 707 (1998).
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At important junctures in this century, scientists have recognized, as a basic
tenet of bio-medical ethics, that the protection of the human being is more
important than the interests of science or society. This is the essence of the
Nuremburg Code, which reaffirmed limits on research on human subjects. The
1975 Helsinki Declaration of the World Medical Association explains,
"[c]oncern for the interests of the subject must always prevail over the interest
of science and society."33 5  More than a quarter of a century ago, Nobel
Prize-winning biologist James D. Watson warned that ethical decisions about
human cloning could not be left to science:
This is a matter far too important to be left solely in the hands of the
scientific and medical communities. The belief that surrogate mothers
and clonal babies are inevitable because science always moves
forward, an attitude expressed to me recently by a scientific colleague,.
represents a form of laissez-faire nonsense dismally reminiscent of the
creed that American business, if left to itself, will solve everybody's
problems. Just as the success of a corporate body in making money
need not set the human condition ahead, neither does every scientific
advance automatically make our lives more "meaningful." No doubt
the person whose experimental skill will eventually bring forth a clonal
baby will be given wide notoriety. But the child who grows up
knowing that the world wants another Picasso may view his creator in
a different light.3"
Society through its civil government must establish limits. Some scientific
knowledge, however interesting or valuable, cannot be obtained by moral
means. When such would occur, society must seek it by other means or wait
until it can be obtained by appropriate means.337
Roe v. Wade and its progeny have created a woman's "liberty interest" in
"terminating a pregnancy" but have limited state protection of unborn human life
only when the woman's personal abortion liberty is involved. In the abortion
context, a physician is only an agent of the mother and has no personal
constitutional liberty interest at stake. Outside that limited context, when the
woman's interest in terminating a pregnancy is not at stake, the states are free
335. World Medical Association, Declaration of Helsinki (rev. ed. 1989), reprinted in 5
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 2766 (Warren Thomas Reich ed., rev. ed. 1995). See also id. at
2767 ("In research on man, the interest of science and society should never take precedence over
considerations related to the well-being of the subject."). See also Declaration of Geneva, supra
note 306, at 2646-47 ("I will maintain the utmost respect for human life from the time of
conception.").
336. Watson, Clonal Man, supra note 297, at 53.
337. PAUL RAMSEY, THE PATIENT As PERSON xiv-xv (1973).
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to protect the unborn human being from homicide at every stage of gestation,
even from fertilization, as some states in fact have done. In the case of
extracorporeal human embryos, no pregnant woman is involved, and thus the
considerations of Roe are absent. The state interest in protecting unborn human
beings has a long tradition that is actively exercised by states today. Scientists
and doctors, as third parties, have no personal constitutional liberty to deprive
an extracorporeal human being of life or dignity. Their capacity as agents of
the woman's liberty interest under Roe is entirely eliminated in the case of
extracorporeal embryos. No broader constitutional liberty in "procreation"
encompasses a right to use technology to clone human embryos in vitro.
Accordingly, the Constitution leaves broad authority to the representative
branches of government to ban or regulate the practice of human cloning.
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